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BASIC COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
DANIEL A. FARBER†
INTRODUCTION 
Global climate change is the greatest environmental challenge fac-
ing the world today.  The most urgent issue is how to prevent further 
accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) that will only fuel the 
process.  The next priority is to implement adaptive measures, limit-
ing harm to the extent that climate change cannot be avoided.  Some 
degree of climate change is inevitable, imposing substantial cost to so-
ciety in the form of direct harm and adaptation expenses.  It is not too 
soon to begin considering how these costs will be allocated.  In par-
ticular, we should begin to consider whether some of the damages 
should be shifted from victims of climate change to responsible par-
ties, such as large-scale emitters of GHGs.1
The reality is that, whatever mitigation measures are adopted, a 
significant degree of climate change seems unavoidable.2  The best 
† Sho Sato Professor of Law and Faculty Director, California Center for Environ-
mental Law and Policy, University of California, Berkeley.  I would like to thank Matt 
Adler, Alex Klass, Bob Rabin, and Elaine Shoben for helpful comments, along with 
workshop participants at Tel Aviv University. 
1 For the purposes of this Article, I will not undertake to review the evidence for 
the reality and seriousness of climate change and the role of GHG emissions in pro-
ducing climate change.  Readers who remain skeptical of this point might begin with 
Part I of the recent Stern Review from the British government.  NICHOLAS STERN, STERN 
REVIEW:  THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1-61 (2007).  A prepublication version 
of the Stern Review is available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/ 
stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm. 
2
As Donald Brown describes: 
Many scientists and policy makers believe that a doubling of CO2 from pre-
industrial levels to 560 ppm may be unavoidable in the 21st century.  This is so 
because the world’s political and economic system cannot respond rapidly 
enough to make faster changes in some major polluting sources such as gaso-
line-powered automobiles or coal-fired power plants.  Some environmental-
ists, however, believe it is still possible to stabilize GHG[s] at 450 ppm, a level 
that would limit the temperature increase (in addition to that which has al-
ready been caused by human activities) to 1.5 to 2 degrees F° during the next 
100 years.  Virtually nobody believes that it is possible to stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations below 450 ppm and concentrations could continue growing 
after that if third world countries do not implement aggressive reduction 
strategies, even if the most ambitious proposal currently under consideration 
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current estimate is that a doubling of CO2 from preindustrial levels 
would result in a temperature increase between 1.5°C and 4.5°C 
(2.7°F to 8.1°F) by the end of this century.3  For this reason, even in 
the best-case scenario, we will be faced with a number of adverse im-
pacts from climate change—and indeed, we are already experiencing 
them: 
[M]any of the climate impacts identified by IPCC [Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change] are likely to occur regardless of the nature of 
the international policy response.  In fact, the IPCC has recently con-
cluded that regional changes in climate, particularly increases in tem-
perature, have already affected a diverse set of physical and biological 
systems in many parts of the world.  Examples of observed changes 
caused by human releases of GHG include shrinkage of glaciers, thawing 
of permafrost, later freezing and earlier break-up of ice on rivers and 
lakes, lengthening of mid-to [sic] high-latitude growing seasons, pole-
ward and altitudinal shifts of plants and animal ranges, declines of some 
plant and animal populations, and earlier flowering of trees, emerging 
of insects, and egg-laying in birds.
4
Designing a fair and efficient system of compensation for climate 
change damage poses great challenges.  In this Article, my goal is only 
to start the process of thinking through these issues.  In particular, I 
will try to show how certain kinds of injuries could be the subject of a 
workable compensation system.  These injuries—involving changes in 
were adopted.  Even if all nations could have stabilized emissions in the year 
2002, the concentrations of GHGs would continue to rise and would approach 
500 ppm by the year 2100.  After that, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere 
would continue to rise for several hundred years before stabilization would be 
achieved.  Even to stabilize CO2 at 1,000 ppm will require reductions of emis-
sions below current levels. 
Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit Global Warming 
Commitments, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,741, 10,756 (2002) (footnotes omit-
ted).  For a general survey of climate change impacts and mitigation strategies, see 
Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change:  Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 34 
ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with author). 
3 Richard A. Kerr et al., Latest Forecast:  Stand by for a Warmer, but Not Scorching, 
World, 312 SCIENCE 351, 351 (2006).  For an up-to-date source of information on cli-
mate science, see RealClimate, http://www.realclimate.org (last visited May 1, 2007). 
4 Brown, supra note 2, at 10,756.  The most recent IPCC findings are available in  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP I, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 7-9 (2007), available at http:// 
ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_SPM.pdf.  For further details on the effects 
of climate change in the United States, see CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR GALBRAITH, 
OBSERVED IMPACTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S. 17-34 (2004), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/observedimpacts/ 
index.cfm. 
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basic geographic characteristics such as sea level or permafrost—are 
readily identifiable, do not raise the complicated causation issues that 
plague other potential forms of damages, and can be measured (at 
least roughly) in a fairly straightforward way. 
In the interest of manageability, I will give only passing attention 
to two other important issues.  The first is whether compensation of 
any kind is warranted in this situation.  I think the answer is yes, but 
the question is obviously a controversial one, and I will provide only a 
sketch of the justification for compensation.  Instead, I will be more 
concerned with assessing the relative attractiveness of various potential 
compensation claims.  The objective is to identify the core claims that 
should be given the highest priority, assuming any claims at all are 
compensated.  A second question is what kind of institutional process, 
such as litigation or an administrative compensation scheme, should 
be used.  I will discuss the alternatives briefly in order to demonstrate 
that the options extend well beyond conventional litigation, but the 
choice between institutional forms is too complicated to address fully 
here.5
To provide a concrete context for the discussion, however, it may 
be helpful to sketch one possible compensation system.  Consider an 
international compensation commission.  The commission would re-
ceive claims from countries that have incurred adaptation expenses 
such as strengthening sea walls or providing alternative sources of 
ecosystem services to replace lost wetlands.  The commission would 
determine which adaptation expenses were reasonable and would 
schedule them for compensation.  Compensation might come directly 
from an international fund; however, an alternative payment system 
might be more appealing if an international trading system for GHGs 
were in place.  In this alternative way of financing compensation, a set 
number of GHG allowances could be set aside for the commission’s 
use.  The commission would use these allowances to pay claims; in 
turn, the claimants could sell them to GHG emitters on the open 
market.  The net effect would be that the sources doing the least to 
reduce their emission levels, and therefore having the greatest need to 
purchase additional emission permits, would indirectly provide com-
pensation for the expenses of adaptation.  Thus, a wealth transfer 
would take place from poorly controlled sources of GHGs to the vic-
5 A third question is whether existing domestic or international laws provide a 
remedy for victims.  This is obviously an important issue, but it is not one that I will try 
to resolve here. 
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tims of climate change.  This is only one possible implementation; for 
example, it is easy to imagine a similar program being established 
within the United States, or to envision compensation proceeding 
through a grant program rather than through adjudication.  No plau-
sible system will precisely measure harm and match victims with his-
toric GHG emitters, but some form of rough justice seems achievable. 
The primary goal of this Article is to identify a manageable subset 
of environmental harms that could be the subject of such a compensa-
tion system.  Part I reviews the expected impacts of climate change 
and provides background on climate change litigation.  Litigation 
provides one possible source of compensation but is not the most 
promising alternative.  In search of guidance for providing climate 
change compensation, Part II examines other compensation schemes, 
dealing with an array of harms ranging from oil spills to terrorist acts.  
These compensation schemes vary in their institutional forms, in what 
damages are compensable, and in their treatment of causation and 
fault issues.  Part III attempts to identify some core, highly foreseeable 
harms resulting from climate change and suggests methods for meas-
uring damages.  Compensation for these harms could be provided in 
various institutional forms.  The most likely claimants would be gov-
ernments rather than individuals; funding could come from assess-
ments against GHG sources or payments by high emission nations. 
My purpose is not to offer a fully matured blueprint for compen-
sation.  It is to put some basic ideas on the table and to suggest that at 
least part of the compensation issue is relatively manageable.  In the 
end, the decision of whether to compensate will be driven largely by 
political decision makers rather than by courts or, even less likely, by 
scholars.  Whether a large-scale compensation plan will ever be 
adopted, let alone when such a step might be taken, remains unclear.  
Even at this early stage, however, it is useful to imagine the outlines of 
a compensation scheme.  Doing so may help focus the debate on 
whether or not to compensate, and it will provide a useful head start 
on actual programmatic design if the decision is ultimately made to 
provide compensation. 
In a country whose political process is only now awakening to the 
reality of the climate change issue, it may seem almost utopian to 
worry about compensation.  Current litigation is likely to attract more 
attention to the issue, as will some current endorsements of the idea 
in international law.  If the issue is not in the forefront today, it seems 
safe to predict that it will be soon. 
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I.  CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND LITIGATION 
As background for discussing compensation, we need to begin by 
surveying some of the likely impacts of climate change that might 
support compensation claims.  In addition, although no successful 
compensation claims yet exist, we need to consider the state of affairs 
in climate change litigation.  Courts have at least begun to acknowl-
edge the reality of harm from climate change—even in the United 
States, where the official governmental position is more skeptical.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court recently held that injury from climate 
change is sufficiently tangible and direct to form a basis for standing.6  
This holding is not directly relevant to compensation claims, but 
seems likely to foster arguments that compensation is desirable. 
A.  Adverse Impacts of Climate Change 
In designing a basic compensation scheme, we can put aside two 
kinds of impacts, even though these impacts are important in consid-
ering adaptation and mitigation.  First, we can put aside effects that 
are extremely diffuse.  These are less likely to be clearly identifiable as 
impacts of climate change or to have identifiable groups of victims 
who might seek compensation.  Diffuse claims are also more likely to 
receive lower priority than compensation of more concentrated 
harms.  For example, individuals’ increased air conditioning costs do 
not seem like compelling candidates for compensation.7
Second, we can also put aside for now the potential of climate 
“surprises”—unlikely (but possible) catastrophic events, such as the 
collapse of the Antarctic or Greenland ice caps (which would cause 
cataclysmic changes in sea level),8 or the destruction of the Gulf 
Stream (which would massively impact European weather).9  What-
6 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).  For further discussion of this 
case and its holding, see infra note 32. 
7 On the other hand, programs implementing precautions against deaths from 
heat waves, which might include subsidized air conditioning, do seem like plausible 
items for compensation. 
8 See Richard B. Alley et al., Ice-Sheet and Sea Level Changes, 310 SCIENCE 456, 457-60 
(2005) (assessing this threat). 
9 Richard A. Kerr, Confronting the Bogeyman of the Climate System, 310 SCIENCE 432, 
432 (2005) (explaining that rapid collapse of the Atlantic circulation system is now 
considered unlikely).  Notably, current models do not include meltwater from 
Greenland (suggesting that such models are “not entirely realistic”).  Id. at 433.  Even 
apart from the possibility of unforeseen future increases in melt rates, the omission of 
this factor from models means that their sea level predictions are probably too low. 
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ever compensation is offered for such extraordinary events is likely to 
be ad hoc and dictated largely by immediate political pressures.  
Moreover, calculation of compensation is likely to take a back seat to 
more urgent expenditures for adaptation and humanitarian aid. 
At least for purposes of a first “cut” at the compensation issue, it 
seems better to start with mid-range impacts—impacts involving sig-
nificant, but not catastrophic, costs that are likely to occur and can be 
clearly identified as consequences of climate change.10  This, in itself, 
is a large universe and likely to grow as our knowledge of climate 
change improves.  For purposes of exploration, we can begin by iden-
tifying three major categories of harm that fit this description. 
The first category involves harm to natural systems that react par-
ticularly strongly to temperature changes.  There is considerable evi-
dence, for example, that coral reefs have been damaged by climate 
change.11  At the other climatic extreme, glaciers and areas of tundra 
are being heavily impacted.  Almost a quarter of the land in the 
Northern Hemisphere is situated on permafrost, much of which 
seems to be melting rapidly.12  Arctic Sea ice is also shrinking at a sur-
prising rate.13  The effects of these changes on native populations may 
be particularly dramatic.  To quote an Inuit hunter, “[o]f the people 
involved in global warming, I think we’re on top of the list of who 
would be most affected. . . . Our way of life, our traditions, maybe our 
families.  Our children may not have a future.”14  It is not clear how 
10 In suggesting that the other possibilities be put aside in the discussion of com-
pensation, I do not mean to imply that they should be disregarded in terms of preven-
tative measures, whether those measures address adaptation or mitigation.  Even very 
unlikely events are worth attending to if the costs are sufficiently high.  It also should 
be noted that there is still considerable uncertainty at the high end of climate change 
estimates.  The Stern Review indicates that “there is up to a one-in-five chance that the 
world would experience a warming in excess of 3°C above pre-industrial [levels] even if 
greenhouse gas concentrations were stabili[z]ed at today’s level of 430 ppm CO2.”  
STERN, supra note 1, at 11-12.  Most of the impacts discussed in this Article assume a 
warming of only 2°C.  In the range between 2°C and 3°C, “the Earth would reach a 
temperature not seen since the middle Pliocene around 3 million years ago.”  Id. at 12. 
11 See Denis Culley, Global Warming, Sea Level Rise and Tort, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
91, 95 & n.35 (2002) (noting a significant decline in coral reproduction rates in 
warmer waters). 
12 ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE:  MAN, NATURE, AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 13-15 (2006); see also id. at 13 (noting that “[n]early every major gla-
cier in the world is shrinking; those in Glacier National Park are retreating so quickly it 
has been estimated that they will vanish entirely by 2030”). 
13 Id. at 25. 
14 Id. at 65. 
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many of these harms should be compensable, but they surely deserve 
consideration.15
The second category involves sea level rise.16  Sea level rise is one 
of the most predictable consequences of climate change.  Apart from 
the unknown contribution of melting from Greenland and Antarc-
tica,17 the simple change in the temperature of the oceans will cause 
thermal expansion, just as increased temperature causes the mercury 
in a thermometer to rise.  This rise in sea level will result in loss of 
coastal lands,18 inundation of some estuary systems with salt water, salt 
water intrusions into some drinking sources, and increased exposure 
to flood damage.19  Sea level change may have particularly drastic ef-
fects on island populations.20  For example, the small island state of 
Tuvalu (perhaps best known as the home of the “.tv” Internet domain 
15 Other forms of ecosystem harm can also be anticipated.  Biologists predict that 
changes in growing season will be managed by some animals (those with small size, 
short life cycles, and large populations), but not by larger, more long-lived animals 
with smaller populations, resulting in major changes in natural communities.  William 
E. Bradshaw & Christina M. Holzapfel, Evolutionary Response to Rapid Climate Change, 
312 SCIENCE 1477, 1478 (2006).  Increases in wildfires are another form of potential 
damage.  See A.L. Westerling et al., Warming and Earlier Spring Increase Western U.S. Forest 
Wildfire Activity, 313 SCIENCE 940, 942-43 (2006) (describing the relationship between 
climate change and wildfires). 
16 Some scientists predict a 2 m increase in sea level under a “business as usual” 
scenario by 2100, but only a 20 cm rise under an optimum regulatory strategy.  E.g., K. 
Hasselmann et al., The Challenge of Long-Term Climate Change, 302 SCIENCE 1923, 1924 
fig.1 (2003).  The most recent IPCC estimates are approximately 0.2 m to 0.6 m, de-
pending on the scenario.  IPCC, supra note 4, at 13 tbl.SPM-3.  The effects of sea level 
rise are discussed in more detail in Susanne C. Moser, Climate Change and Sea-Level  
Rise in Maine and Hawai’i:  The Changing Tides of an Issue Domain, in GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS:  INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE 201, 201-13 (Ronald B. 
Mitchell et al. eds., 2006); DAN CAYAN ET AL., PROJECTING FUTURE SEA LEVEL: 
A REPORT FROM CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE CENTER 5-11 (Mar. 2006) (Cal.  
Energy Comm’n, White Paper No. CEC-500-2005-202-SF), available at http:// 
www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-202/CEC-500-2005-202-SF.PDF. 
17 On the potential for catastrophic melting in these areas, see STERN, supra note 
1, at 20-21. 
18 See A. BARRIE PITTOCK, CLIMATE CHANGE:  TURNING UP THE HEAT 264, 267-68, 
278 (2005) (providing examples of land loss in areas including China, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and the United States). 
19 See Kolbert, supra note 12, at 123-24 (reporting a British governmental study in-
dicating that what are now hundred-year floods could become routine by late in this 
century); see also PITTOCK, supra note 18, at 118 (stating that without adaptive meas-
ures, annual flood losses would increase from £1 billion to £27 billion in different sce-
narios). 
20 See Culley, supra note 11, at 105-07 (describing the effects of sea level rise on 
several island nations). 
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name) is seeking ways to evacuate its entire population.21  Sea level 
rise could also cause dramatic losses in wetlands in the United States.22  
Because the slope of coastal areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts is 
low, a 40 cm rise in sea level could result in as much as 60 m of beach 
erosion, at a cost in the billions of dollars.23  To get a sense of the po-
tential economic impact, consider the following estimates regarding 
sea level rise:  “[A] half-meter rise in sea level would place $185 billion 
of property and infrastructure in jeopardy by 2100, and . . . the finan-
cial cost of protecting all developed areas from a half-meter sea-level 
rise would be $50 to $66 billion . . . .”24  Clearly, at least over a suffi-
cient time span, these are very serious damages. 
A third category of predictable harm also relates to water.  Accord-
ing to the British government’s Stern Review, “[c]hanges in rainfall pat-
terns and extreme weather events will lead to more severe impacts on 
people than that caused by warming alone.”25  There are strong indi-
cations that climate change may lead to much more severe droughts 
in some regions.26  Many areas rely on single-source water systems that 
are “extremely sensitive” to climate.27  Severe stress on water supplies 
21 Id. at 91-93, 106. 
22 See id. at 100-01 (noting that “[a] mere 50 cm rise in sea levels would inundate 
fifty per cent of America’s coastal wetlands”). 
23
David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:  Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12-13 (2003). 
24 WILLIAM E. EASTERLING III ET AL., COPING WITH GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:   
THE ROLE OF ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2004), available at http:// 
www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/adaptation/index.cfm.  
This estimate may be on the high side, but even if we discount by a factor of two, the 
figures are still impressive.  On the other hand, given the Hurricane Katrina experi-
ence, we may be entitled to wonder whether flood control systems will necessarily be 
effective. 
25 STERN, supra note 1, at 17. 
26 See, e.g., KOLBERT, supra note 12, at 108-18 (noting the “Rocky Mountain  
states and California” as likely candidates in the United States); Carl T. Hall,  
Global Warming Study Forecasts More Water Shortages, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 2005,  
at A4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/11/17/ 
MNG4EPHK51.DTL&hw=Global+Warm; Michael McCarthy, The Century of Drought, 
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 4, 2006, at 1; Richard M. Adams & Dannele E. Peck, 
Drought and Climate Change:  Implications for the West 3 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.economics.noaa.gov/ 
library/documents/benefits_of_weather_and_climate_forecasts/drought-climate_ 
change-implications_for_west.doc. 
27 Kenneth D. Frederick, Water Resources and Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
ECONOMICS AND POLICY 67, 68-69 (Michael A. Toman ed., 2001). 
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is also a possibility in some parts of the world, such as Africa28 and Aus-
tralia.29  In California, shifts in seasonal precipitation patterns could 
reduce the availability of water during the summer growing season.30  
Increases in flooding are also likely to be significant in some areas.31  
It may be difficult to tie any one year of drought or a particular flood 
to climate change, but dealing with these threats will clearly involve 
significant adaptation costs. 
All of these damages involve impacts on basic geography in the 
form of diminished coastlines, available water, glaciers, and tundra.  
In most instances, rather than turning on the nuances of climate 
change models, these changes seem quite predictable.  Because we are 
focusing on the context of compensation, we do not need to know 
with any certainty that these effects exist.  If they are sufficiently likely, 
precautionary measures may be warranted, for which compensation 
payments may be appropriate.  If they actually take place, they can be 
linked retrospectively with climate change because they all involve 
sharp deviations from clear historical patterns.  These are changes in 
the sorts of local conditions one might expect to see in an atlas or 
other geographic reference. 
These “geographic damages,” as we might call them, clearly do 
not exhaust the universe of harm from climate change or of potential 
damage claims.  Rather, they are something like the core of potential 
damages.  If we can map out a compensation system for these claims, 
we can later consider how to expand it to cover other forms of dam-
ages. 
B.  Current Efforts To Obtain Compensation 
Climate change litigation of various kinds is clearly on the in-
crease, and the trend is to hold that potential damage from climate 
change is a legally cognizable injury.32  Although the favorable deci-
28 PITTOCK, supra note 18, at 253-54.  Note also that “[p]otential increases in the 
frequency and intensity of drought across subhumid Africa are likely to increase deser-
tification.”  Id. at 255. 
29 Id. at 256-57.  China may be vulnerable to drought increases as well.  Id. at 263. 
30 Id. at 278-79. 
31 For the most up-to-date information on how climate change will affect severe 
weather events, see National Climatic Data Center, Extreme Weather and  
Climate Events, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/severeweather/extremes.html 
(last visited May 1, 2007). 
32 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462-63 (2007) (holding that plaintiffs 
did have standing to sue, and that the EPA, despite the agency’s objections, does have 
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sions have involved issues of standing or administrative action rather 
than liability for damages, scholars have begun to discuss the damages 
issue in earnest.33
authority to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles), reversing and remanding 415 
F.3d 50, 54-56 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that defendant EPA questioned standing only 
on the basis of causation and redressability, not injury, and proceeding to the merits as 
in statutory standing cases); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 
2d 957, 971 (D. Or. 2006) (finding that potential victims of climate change have stand-
ing); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *8 
(N.D. Cal.  Aug. 23, 2005) (same); cf. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 
794, 796-97, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a state agency’s quantification of 
harm from CO2 emissions).  But see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 
2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that public nuisance actions against utilities “pre-
sent non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to the political branches, not 
the Judiciary”). 
 At the international level, see Australian Conservation Foundation v. Minister for  
Planning (2004) VCAT 2029 (Victorian Civil & Admin. Trib.) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2004/2029.html (holding that the 
impact of GHG emissions must be taken into account in the company’s planning deci-
sions); Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Nigeria Ltd., [Nov. 14, 2005], No. 
FHC/B/CS/53/05 (F.H.C.) (Nigeria), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/ 
media/gas.flaring.suit.nov2005/ni.shell.nov05.judgment.pdf (condemning, as viola-
tive of fundamental human rights, companies’ natural gas flaring). 
 Section 601 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987) 
states that a nation “is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the ex-
tent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction 
or control . . . are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of 
another state.”  This principle is based on the famous Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 
R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1906 (1941).  In that case, the panel decided that 
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner 
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties 
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.   
Id. at 1965.  The decision references both international principles and U.S. common 
law.  Id. at 1963-65.  A claim based on the Trail Smelter principle has been filed against 
the United States by Inuit representatives in the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights.  See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking 
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions 
of the United States 5 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ 
ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf.  A summary of this and other recent litigation can be found 
in ROBERT MELTZ, GLOBAL WARMING:  THE LITIGATION HEATS UP 18 (Cong. Research 
Serv. Rep. RL32764, April 3, 2006). 
33 For such discussions, see Grossman, supra note 23, at 16-22; Vincent S. Olesz-
kiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation Against Corporate 
Defendants, 27 INT’L ENV’T REP. 936, 940-41 (2004); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of 
Climate Change Litigation:  Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1789, 1794-95 (2005); see also Angela Lipanovich, Comment, Smoke Before Oil:  
Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation Is Feasible, 35 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429, 432-33 (2005). 
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A recent case filed by the State of California illustrates this poten-
tial form of litigation.34  In an action filed in federal district court 
against leading automobile manufacturers, the State alleges two 
causes of action for public nuisance:  one under federal common law 
and the other under California state law.  The complaint focuses on 
several key examples of damages.  First, the State allegedly will be re-
quired to spend large sums of money on studies and infrastructure 
changes to its water systems:  the Sierra Nevada snowpack, which is the 
source of much of California’s water, has allegedly been shrinking.  
This decrease in snowpack is likely to increase flooding and interfere 
with the State’s water system.35  Second, rising sea levels allegedly in-
crease beach erosion and salt infiltration into the Sacramento Bay-
Delta, which will require increased expenditures on levees.36  Third, 
climate change is allegedly causing more extreme heat events, increas-
ing the risk of injury or death (especially to the elderly).37  Finally, the 
complaint alleges that 
[d]ozens of other impacts have begun or are anticipated with a high 
level of certainty, including increased risk and intensity of wildfires, risk 
of prolonged heat waves, loss of moisture due to earlier snow pack melt 
and related impacts on forests and other ecosystems, and a change in 
ocean ecology as water warms.
38
The complaint adds that “[a]ll of these impacts are the subject of 
State study and planning, which costs the State millions of dollars.”39  
Consequently, the State requests that the defendants be held jointly 
and severally liable for monetary damages.40
Claims of this kind face multiple barriers, including ill-defined law 
in the areas of public nuisance, proximate cause, preemption, and 
proof of damages.41  Future claims are probably most likely to be filed 
34 Complaint, People ex rel. Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 20, 2006). 
35 Id. at 10-11. 
36 Id. at 11. 
37 Id. at 12. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 14.  The state also requests declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees.  Id. 
41 For descriptions of these problems, see Grossman, supra note 23, at 23-27, 33-42; 
Oleszkiewicz & Sanders, supra note 33, at 940-42.  The issues that will arise in this litiga-
tion were explored in more depth by other participants in this Symposium.  See, e.g., 
David T. Buente, Presentation, So You Want To Try a Climate Change Case?, at slides 
7-10 (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with author) (describing causation and proof of damages 
problems). 
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by “[c]itizen property owners on islands and in coastal states, those 
that rely on snow pack or runoff for drinking water, and the states and 
municipalities that either own real property or are responsible for in-
frastructure repair and maintenance for their populations.”42  The fol-
lowing appraisal of the prospects for this litigation seems plausible: 
Past litigation in U.S. courts against industries such as the tobacco indus-
try and asbestos industry proceeded cautiously at first.  Plaintiffs adapted 
to defense arguments, science caught up with the causation arguments 
and discovery often resulted in unfavorable documents being pro-
duced . . . . 
 Causation remains a big obstacle for potential plaintiffs to overcome 
in climate change litigation . . . . [P]laintiffs and their attorneys will draw 
on the same lessons discussed above to pursue claims and will reach a 
point where they can obtain significant discovery from defendants.  Law-
suits do not have to be successful on the merits before they cause a de-
fendant to spend significant time and resources.
43
If nothing else, this litigation is likely to focus attention on com-
pensation issues and uncover useful information; it may also increase 
political pressure for a nonlitigation solution. 
II.  POTENTIALLY ANALOGOUS COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
Climate change is an unprecedented global problem.  Conse-
quently, there is a vacuum of established rules and precedents dealing 
with this precise situation.  It makes sense, then, to consider the possi-
ble lessons of compensation schemes designed for other kinds of 
widespread injuries.  The compensation schemes I will consider in-
volve a broad range of harmful events:  terrorist acts, toxic torts, dam-
age to natural resources, slavery and racial discrimination, natural dis-
asters, and environmental damages caused by war.  Clearly, none of 
these situations is an exact fit with climate change, but each provides 
some illuminating perspectives on the problems of designing a cli-
mate change compensation system. 
A.  The 9/11 Fund and Similar Compensation Schemes 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
Congress established a special victim’s compensation fund.44  Com-
42 Oleszkiewicz & Sanders, supra note 33, at 937. 
43 Id. at 943. 
44 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, tit. 
iv, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 
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pensation was limited to individuals who were present at one of the 
crash sites and who suffered “physical harm or death.”45  The statute 
covers economic loss, which is defined as including, among other 
things, medical expenses, loss of earnings, and “loss of business or 
employment opportunities . . . to the extent recovery for such loss is 
allowed under applicable State law”; it also covers noneconomic loss 
such as “physical and emotional pain.”46  The law gives victims the al-
ternative of going through the tort system, but tort recoveries against 
aircraft carriers are limited to the insurance coverage of the defen-
dants.47
A special master was appointed to administer the fund.  The spe-
cial master issued regulations to govern claims48 that in some instances 
seemed to go significantly beyond the statutory language.  Although 
the statute called for an offset for life insurance and pension benefits, 
the special master reduced the offset to the extent of the individuals’ 
policy payments or pension contributions.49  The special master also 
set an approximate $250,000 floor on economic recoveries, and estab-
lished a presumptive schedule covering economic loss, based on age, 
family size, and recent earnings, with a cap for the highest-level in-
comes.50  Additionally, the special master created a schedule for non-
economic losses, with $250,000 to each victim, and $100,000 each to 
close relatives.51  Apparently, the special master’s strategy was to 
“closely enough approximate the range of tort compensation to make 
no-fault benefits under the Fund an offer that could not be refused by 
most eligible parties.”52  As it turned out, ninety-seven percent of the 
(Supp. II 2002)).  For an overview of the scheme, see Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. 
Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES:  A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 303, 335-41 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 
2006).  For criticism of the 9/11 compensation scheme, see Elizabeth Berkowitz, The 
Problematic Role of the Special Master:  Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006).  The opt-out cases are now being 
considered in federal district court, along with claims for respiratory damages. 
45 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 
405(c)(1)-(c)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 239 (2001). 
46 Id. § 402(5), (7), 115 Stat. 237. 
47 Id. § 408(a), 115 Stat. 240. 
48 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2006). 
49 Id. § 104.47. 
50 Id. § 104.21(b)(5), .41, .43, .45. 
51 Id. § 104.44, .46. 
52 Rabin & Bratis, supra note 44, at 341. 
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nearly 3000 surviving families applied to the fund, with only seventy 
families opting out.53
The 9/11 scheme is clearly distinguishable in important respects 
from the problems posed by climate change compensation.  The Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attack was a discrete event that caused indisput-
able harm to affected individuals.  People caught in the collapse of 
the twin towers died; those nearby may have experienced immediate 
injuries.  Thus, screening claimants was not a major problem.  Also, 
the 9/11 compensation scheme may have had a partially patriotic mo-
tive. 
Nevertheless, a couple of lessons may be drawn from the 9/11 
fund.  Clearly, the threat of tort liability pervaded the construction of 
9/11 compensation, and the potential for tort liability also will likely 
prompt climate change compensation in other forms.  Also, the 9/11 
fund illustrates the importance of providing standardized damage 
measures in the interests of efficient dispute resolution and fairness 
among victims.  Moreover, the fund is a useful reminder, given the 
litigation orientation of American lawyers, that under some circum-
53 Id.  The Price-Anderson Act (also known as the Atomic Energy Damages Act), 
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000), is another example of a compensation scheme designed to 
limit tort litigation in order to protect a critical industry.  The Act caps the total liabil-
ity of the nuclear industry for damages resulting from a single nuclear accident, in  
return modifying normal tort rules to make it easier to establish liability.  § 2210(b).  
The purpose of the statute was to enable the nuclear industry to obtain insurance cov-
erage.  § 2210(a).  The Act also provides for assessments of the industry as a whole  
to cover additional victim compensation.  § 2210(b).  For further information about  
the Act, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRICE-ANDERSON  
ACT 4-9 (1999), available at http://www.gc.doe.gov/price-anderson/public-comments/ 
Nuclear%20Energy%20Agency/paa-rep.pdf. 
 A more recent compensation scheme presents a less happy picture.  At the end  
of 2005, the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA) was signed 
into law.  Pub. L. No. 109-148, Div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818-32 (2005) (codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e (Supp. 2006)).  The statute provides immunity (for any-
thing less than willful misconduct) for pharmaceutical manufacturers producing vac-
cines and other countermeasures for a biological emergency such as a bio-terror attack 
or pandemic flu outbreak.  Id. § 247d-6d.  The Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services seems to have broad discretion in declaring such an emergency.  
§ 247d-6d(b).  Once an emergency is declared, a “Covered Countermeasure Process 
Fund” is established.  § 247d-6e(a).  No appropriations will be provided until after the 
emergency is declared and the fund is established.  § 247d-6de(b).  Thus, there is no 
guarantee that funding will be forthcoming, which could leave victims in the position 
of having their tort remedies preempted, but without any alternative means of  
compensation.  See Brian Kurt Copper II, “High and Dry?”  The Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act and Liability Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers  
24-28 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896299. 
  
2007] COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1619 
 
stances, administrative compensation schemes may provide a more ef-
ficient and even fairer alternative. 
B.  Environmental Damage and the United Nations  
Compensation Commission 
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was es-
tablished after the first Iraq war to handle claims against Iraq for war-
related damages.54  The United Nations Security Council held that 
Iraq “is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, in-
cluding environmental damage and the depletion of natural re-
sources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corpora-
tions, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait.”55  According to the UNCC, compensable environmental 
claims include 
(a)  Abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including ex-
penses directly relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil 
in coastal and international waters; 
(b)  Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the envi-
ronment or future measures which can be documented as reasonably 
necessary to clean and restore the environment; 
(c)  Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental dam-
age for the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring 
the environment; 
(d)  Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical 
screenings for the purpose of investigation and combating increased 
health risks as a result of the environmental damage; and 
(e)  Depletion of or damage to natural resources.
56
These provisions gave rise to intense disputes about compensation 
for damage to pure (nonmarketable) environmental resources and 
for interim damages to those resources prior to restoration.  The 
UNCC ultimately held that these damages were compensable.57  One 
54 For information about the UNCC, see United Nations Compensation Commis-
sion, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc (last visited May 1, 2007). 
55 S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
56 U.N. Comp. Comm’n [UNCC], Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of 
Commissioners Concerning the First Instal[l]ment of “F4” Claims ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
S/AC.26/2001/16 (June 22, 2001), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/reports/ 
r01-16.pdf. 
57 Cymie Payne, UN Commission Awards Compensation for Environmental and Public 
Health Damage from 1990-91 Gulf War, INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y Int’l Law), Aug. 10, 2005,  
¶ 7, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/08/insights050810.html. 
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method used to measure the value of resources was the cost of mitiga-
tion measures, such as providing alternative resources, which was used 
as a way to measure the loss of ecosystem services.58  The UNCC 
awarded approximately $5 billion for 109 successful claims.59
There seems to be growing international recognition that “envi-
ronmental damages will often extend beyond that which can be read-
ily quantified in terms of clean-up costs or property devaluation.”60  
Thus, harm to “environmental values (biodiversity, amenity, etc.—
sometimes referred to as ‘non-use values’) is, as a matter of principle, 
no less real and compensable than damage to property, though it may 
be difficult to quantify.”61
Like the 9/11 fund, the UNCC dealt with the fallout from a dis-
crete and readily identifiable human event.  Nevertheless, the UNCC’s 
resolution of claims gives us especially useful lessons for climate 
change compensation.  The environmental impacts of the Gulf War 
were multitudinous and varied, presenting considerable difficulty for 
damage assessment.  The UNCC’s decisions are good precedent for 
extending compensation beyond harm done to marketable resources 
58 The application of this method of damage assessment is described in a recent 
overview of the UNCC’s decisions: 
Several claimants put a value on their temporary natural resource losses by 
proposing environmental projects designed to compensate for the loss of eco-
logical services that the natural resources would have provided, had they not 
been damaged.  Although the Panel viewed the proposed valuation methods 
using compensatory restoration projects as “relatively novel,” it was willing to 
apply them “where there is sufficient evidence that primary restoration will 
not fully compensate for any identified losses.”  Accordingly, the Panel made 
awards that were quantified according to the cost of various compensatory 
projects:  a cooperative rangeland management program to restore rangeland 
and wildlife habitat damaged by the influx of refugees into Jordan, and shore-
line preserves in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  In another case—Iran’s claim for 
damage to rangelands from the presence of refugees—the Panel found it 
more appropriate to use the price of fodder to calculate an award rather than 
the value that Iran derived from lost ecological services. 
Payne, supra note 57, ¶ 8 (footnotes omitted) (quoting UNCC, Report and Recommenda-
tions made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth Instal[l]ment of “F4” Claims, 
U.N. Doc S/AC 26/2005/10 (2005)).  For discussions of the concept of ecosystem ser-
vices, see James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services:  Notes from the Field, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 871-75 (2005); James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services:  Sci-
ence, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 309-13 (2001); James Salzman, Valu-
ing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 890-92 (1997). 
59 Cymie R. Payne, Environmental Damage at the United Nations Compensation 
Commission 4 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
60 U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
Its 53d Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (cmt. art. 36, at 252 ¶ 16). 
61 Id. 
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to include harm done to environmental amenities.  The UNCC’s ap-
proach to determining damages also may provide a workable model in 
the context of climate change.  By focusing on the expense of mitigat-
ing the environmental harm, the UNCC has avoided difficult prob-
lems of identifying long-term environmental effects and valuing the 
resulting harms. 
C.  U.S. Experience with Claims for Damages to Natural Resources 
The United States has considerable experience with compensa-
tion for harm to natural resources caused by incidents such as oil spills 
and other releases of hazardous substances.  The primary mechanism 
for compensation in this context has been litigation by governmental 
bodies under state or federal statutes.  Notably, culpability has played 
a secondary role at best. 
Under U.S. law, compensation for nonmarket damages to envi-
ronmental resources clearly exists.  The default measure of damages is 
restoration cost.  As the First Circuit has explained, 
the appropriate primary standard for determining damages in a case 
such as this is the cost reasonably to be incurred by the sovereign or its 
designated agency to restore or rehabilitate the environment in the af-
fected area to [its] pre-existing condition, or as close thereto as is feasi-
ble without grossly disproportionate expenditures.  The focus in deter-
mining such a remedy should be on the steps a reasonable and prudent 
sovereign or agency would take to mitigate the harm done by the pollu-
tion, with attention to such factors as technical feasibility, harmful side 
effects, compatibility with or duplication of such regeneration as is natu-
rally to be expected, and the extent to which efforts beyond a certain 
point would become either redundant or disproportionately expen-
sive. . . . 
 There may be circumstances where direct restoration of the affected 
area is either physically impossible or so disproportionately expensive 
that it would not be reasonable to undertake such a remedy.  Some 
other measure of damages might be reasonable in such cases, at least 
where the process of natural regeneration will be too slow to ensure res-
toration within a reasonable period. . . . [O]ne possibility [is] “the rea-
sonable cost of acquiring resources to offset the loss.”
62
Oil spill litigation also provides some interesting statements about 
issues of proximate cause, which may well loom large in the climate 
62 Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675-76 (1st Cir. 1980) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.  
§ 1321(f)(4)-(5)). 
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change context.  In Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., the plaintiffs were consum-
ers who alleged that the Exxon Valdez oil spill had resulted in higher 
oil prices.63  The flaw in their claim was the existence of intervening 
causes: 
In this case, the spill itself did not directly cause any injury to the appel-
lants.  Rather, plaintiffs alleged the spill triggered a series of intervening 
events, including the decision of the United States Coast Guard to close 
the Port of Valdez to facilitate clean-up efforts; the alleged decision by 
refineries in the western United States to raise prices rather than to use 
their own oil reserves to make up any shortage; and the decision of 
wholesalers, distributors and retailers to pass on these price increases.
64
The court concluded that the “plaintiffs themselves alleged the exis-
tence of at least one intervening act causing the price hike:  the al-
leged decision of California oil refiners to exploit the supposed short-
age.”65
Benefiel was only one piece of the massive litigation arising out of 
the Exxon Valdez spill.66  The district court held that some of these 
claims were foreclosed by the rule pronounced in Robins Dry Dock & 
Repair Co. v. Flint, which requires that a person must suffer “direct 
physical harm” in order to recover economic losses.67  On the other 
hand, there is a recognized exception to Robins for commercial fish-
63 959 F.2d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 1992). 
64 Id. at 807. 
65 Id. at 808; see also Adkins v. Trans–Alaska Pipeline Liab. Fund, 101 F.3d 86, 89 
(9th Cir. 1996) (applying the Benefiel test to the lost-profit claims of an electrical com-
pany, a cafe, tourist businesses, and boat repair companies). 
66 For an overview of the litigation, see Deborah S. Bardwick, Note, The American 
Tort System’s Response to Environmental Disaster:  The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 
19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259 (2000).  The author concludes that despite the magnitude of 
the plaintiffs’ recovery, it still was inadequate: 
Based on the vast extent of litigation and multi-billion-dollar judgments 
awarded against Exxon, a casual observer might acquire an impression that 
the legal system fully compensated the losses suffered by those impacted by 
the spill.  However, the legal system in fact denied redress to many plaintiffs 
who lost most of their livelihoods as a result of damage to natural resources.  
Many plaintiffs also did not receive compensation for non-market-based, in-
tangible values that the resources had given them. 
Id. at 262.  Bardwick calls for “statutes that are specifically written to address the legiti-
mate claims of individuals who suffer significant economic loss as an indirect conse-
quence of the disaster, and create a right for native groups to recover for the actual full 
extent of their harm from loss of a subsistence lifestyle.”  Id. at 289. 
67 See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), 1994 WL 182856, at *1, *5 (D. 
Alaska Mar. 23, 1994) (citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 
(1927)) (concluding that the Robins rule barred most claims for nonpecuniary dam-
ages). 
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ermen.  The district court held that this exception applied to fisheries 
that were actually closed to fishing by the spill, including claims that 
the market value of their subsequent salmon catch was decreased on 
the Japanese market because of concerns about contamination.68
Beyond the direct economic effects of the spill, Alaska natives also 
sought compensation for the disturbance caused to their way of life.  
The Ninth Circuit held that these damages were noncompensable: 
Admittedly, the oil spill affected the communal life of Alaska Natives, but 
whatever injury they suffered (other than the harvest loss), though po-
tentially different in degree than that suffered by other Alaskans, was not 
different in kind.  We agree with the district court that the right to lead 
subsistence lifestyles is not limited to Alaska Natives.  While the oil spill 
may have affected Alaska Natives more severely than other members of 
the public, the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontami-
nated nature, and cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psycho-
logical benefits in pristine natural surroundings is shared by all Alaskans.  
The Class [of Alaskan natives] therefore has failed to prove any “special 
injury” to support a public nuisance action.
69
Much of current law concerning damages to natural resources in-
volves a connection to hazardous waste liability.  Pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA),70 responsible parties, such as waste site 
owners, operators, or waste transporters, can be liable for injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from releases of 
hazardous waste.71  The scope of this liability includes the reasonable 
cost of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss.72  Section 101(16) of 
CERCLA defines “natural resources” to mean 
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water sup-
plies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust 
by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States (includ-
ing the resources of the fishery conservation zone established by the 
68 Id. at *6.  For a fuller discussion of the Robins rule, see Victor P. Goldberg, Re-
covery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon “Valdez” Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1994). 
69 Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 821c, cmt. B (1977)). 
70 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, amended by Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000). 
72 Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).  Note that the statutory scheme imposes strict liability; no 
proof of culpable mental state or negligence is needed to support a compensation 
claim. 
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Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act), any 
State or local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, 
if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any 
member of an Indian tribe.
73
Under section 107(f) of CERCLA, compensation for injury to 
natural resources is payable to the following entities:  the U.S. gov-
ernment, any state for resources “within the State or belonging to, 
managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such State,” and any 
Indian tribe in specified situations.74  The statute creates no private 
cause of action for natural resource damage.  Authority to sue is 
vested in the President—when suing on behalf of the United States—
or in the “authorized representative of any State,” who “shall act on 
behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources.”75  Sums re-
covered must be retained by the trustee “for use only to restore, re-
place, or acquire the equivalent of” the natural resources injured, de-
stroyed, or lost.76
CERCLA provides compensation for injury to an important but 
limited category of natural resources.  Section 101(16) speaks of re-
sources “belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, 
or otherwise controlled by” the government.77  This language seems to 
encompass not only resources owned by a government, but also those 
subject to the “public trust,” such as navigable waters, wetlands, and 
parklands.  Less clear is whether the language also includes resources 
that are regulated by a government for purposes of environmental pro-
tection—such as endangered species, coastal zones, aquifers providing 
public water supplies, and the ambient air—or that could be regulated 
constitutionally.78
How are the recoverable damages to be measured?  Section 
301(c) of CERCLA directs the President to promulgate regulations for 
73 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (citation omitted). 
74 Id. § 9607(f). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. § 9601(16). 
78 See Barry Breen, CERCLA’s Natural Resource Damage Provisions:  What Do We Know 
So Far?, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,304, 10,305-06 (1984) (discussing the “nexus require-
ment” of CERCLA’s “natural resources” definition).  Another possible analogy for cli-
mate change compensation might be liability for cleanup of hazardous waste, which is 
covered elsewhere in CERCLA.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (providing cleanup standards 
for “hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants”). 
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“the assessment of damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of” 
natural resources.79  These regulations shall specify: 
(A) standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal 
field observation, including establishing measures of damages based on 
units of discharge or release or units of affected area, and (B) alternative 
protocols for conducting assessments in individual cases to determine 
the type and extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction, or loss.  
Such regulations shall identify the best available procedures to deter-
mine such damages, including both direct and indirect injury, destruc-
tion, or loss and shall take into consideration factors including, but not 
limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or 
resource to recover.
80
The “standard procedures” are referred to as “Type A” rules, and the 
“alternative protocols” as “Type B” rules. 
The President assigned responsibility for promulgating the regula-
tions to the Department of the Interior (DOI).  In 1986, the DOI be-
latedly published final regulations containing both Type A and Type B 
assessment rules.81  Both sets of rules were challenged in court by state 
governments, environmental organizations, and industry groups.82  
Major portions of the Type B rules were found to violate CERCLA in 
Ohio v. Department of the Interior.83  According to the court, the “most 
significant issue” in the Ohio case concerned the validity of a provision 
stating that damages should be “the lesser of:  restoration or replace-
ment costs; or diminution of use values.”84  The DOI rules defined 
“use value” as 
the value to the public of recreational or other public uses of the re-
source, as measured by changes in consumer surplus, any fees or other 
payments collectable by the government or Indian tribe for a private 
79 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1). 
80 Id. § 9651(c)(2). 
81 The Type A and Type B regulations have been codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11, un-
der the title of Natural Resource Damage Assessment Regulations. 
82 Type A rules for coastal and marine environments were upheld in part and va-
cated in part in Colorado v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  In 
1996, the Department promulgated further Type A rules for coastal and marine envi-
ronments and Great Lakes environments.  National Resource Damage Assessments—-
Type A Procedures, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,560 (1996) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1997)).  
The court upheld these Type A procedures in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Depart-
ment of Interior, 134 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
83 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding in part and invalidating in part 
the DOI’s Type B rules).  This case was decided the same day as Colorado v. Department 
of Interior. 
84 Id. at 441 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987)). 
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party’s use of the natural resource, and any economic rent accruing to a 
private party because the government or Indian tribe does not charge a 
fee or price for the use of the resource.
85
The state and environmental challengers in Ohio argued that 
CERCLA requires damages to be at least sufficient to pay the cost in 
every case of restoring, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the 
damaged resource.  Because, in many cases, lost use values will be 
lower than the cost of restoration or replacement, the DOI’s rule 
would result in damage awards too small to pay for restoration.  The 
court used an example—which may have been inspired by the then-
recent Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska—to illustrate the “enormous 
practical significance” of the “lesser of” rule: 
[I]magine a hazardous substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals and 
destroys a habitat for seabirds at a sealife reserve.  The lost use value of 
the seals and seabird habitat would be measured by the market value of 
the fur seals’ pelts (which would be approximately $15 each) plus the 
selling price per acre of land comparable in value to that on which the 
spoiled bird habitat was located.  Even if, as likely, that use value turns 
out to be far less than the cost of restoring the rookery and seabird habi-
tat, it would nonetheless be the only measure of damages eligible for the 
presumption of recoverability under the Interior rule.
86
The court held that, under CERCLA, the DOI was not entitled to 
treat use value and restoration cost as having “equal presumptive le-
gitimacy” as a measure of damages to natural resources.87  Primary 
among the statutory provisions cited by the court was section 
107(f)(1), which states that natural resource damages recovered by a 
government trustee are “for use only to restore, replace, or acquire 
the equivalent of such natural resources,” and that the measure of 
damages “shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to re-
store or replace such resources.”88  The court concluded that Con-
gress intended “to establish a distinct preference for restoration costs 
as the measure of damages.”89
The DOI sought to justify its “lesser of” rule as being economically 
efficient.  The court replied as follows: 
85 Id. at 475 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(1) (1988)). 
86 Id. at 442 (footnotes omitted). 
87 Id. at 444. 
88 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000)). 
89 Id. 
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Under DOI’s economic efficiency view, making restoration cost the 
measure of damages would be a waste of money whenever restoration 
would cost more than the use value of the resource. . . . 
. . . Congress’ refusal to view use value and restoration cost as having 
equal presumptive legitimacy merely recognizes that natural resources 
have value that is not readily measured by traditional means.  Congress 
delegated to Interior the job of deciding at what point the presumption 
of restoration falls away, but its repeated emphasis on the primacy of res-
toration rejected the underlying premise of Interior’s rule, which is that 
restoration is wasteful if its cost exceeds—by even the slightest amount—
the diminution in use value of the injured resource.
90
With respect to the determination of “use value,” the DOI regula-
tions have prescribed methods to be employed when the damaged 
natural resources are not traded in the market.  One of these methods 
is known as contingent valuation, or CV.  Some parties in the Ohio 
case challenged DOI’s acceptance of contingent valuation in the regu-
lations.  The court rejected the challenge, saying in part: 
 The CV process “includes all techniques that set up hypothetical 
markets to elicit an individual’s economic valuation of a natural re-
source.”  CV involves a series of interviews with individuals for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the values they respectively attach to particular 
changes in particular resources. . . . 
 It cannot be gainsaid that DOI’s decision to adopt CV was made intel-
ligently and cautiously.  DOI scrutinized a vast array of position papers 
and discussions addressing the use of CV.  It recognized and acknowl-
edged that CV needs to be “properly structured and professionally ap-
plied.”  It eliminated a feature of CV, as originally proposed, that might 
have resulted in overly high assessments.  We find DOI’s promulgation 
of CV methodology reasonable and consistent with congressional intent, 
and therefore worthy of deference.
91
In 1994, the DOI promulgated new regulations on natural re-
source damage assessments in response to the Ohio decision.92  These 
regulations allow “trustee officials to recover the costs of restoration, 
rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent re-
sources in all cases.”93
90 Id. at 456-57 (footnotes omitted). 
91 Id. at 475-77 (quoting Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Final Rule, 51 
Fed. Reg. 27,720, 27,721 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1988))) (foot-
notes omitted). 
92 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (Mar. 
25, 1994) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93 (2004)). 
93 Id. at 14,264 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.15 (2004)).  The 1994 regulations were 
upheld in almost all respects in Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of Interior, 88 
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The CERCLA regulations are echoed by a separate legal scheme 
relating to oil spills.  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 provides that the 
measure of natural resource damages is “(A) the cost of restoring, re-
habilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged 
natural resources; (B) the diminution in value of those natural re-
sources pending restoration; plus (C) the reasonable cost of assessing 
those damages.”94
These costs are to be assessed with respect to restoration plans, 
which are to be promulgated by federal or state trustees.95  Double re-
coveries are precluded.96  The President must issue damage assess-
ment regulations, and, pursuant to those regulations, a rebuttable 
presumption of correctness applies to damage determinations.97
One of the components of damages described above is the cost of 
restoration.  Arguably, only restoration can fully compensate the pub-
lic for loss of a natural area.98  Unfortunately, one of the lessons of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill is that our technological capabilities in the area 
of restoration are still quite primitive, and may, in fact, be counter-
productive.99  Paralleling the CERCLA regulations for natural re-
source damages, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) developed equivalent rules under the Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990.100
F.3d 1191, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  For further discussion of the valuation of natural 
resource damages, see Christine M. Augustyniak, Economic Valuation of Services Provided 
by Natural Resources:  Putting a Price on the “Priceless”, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 392-403 
(1993); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods?  Reconsidering 
Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 
497-515 (1994).  For more on the contingent valuation method, see Ronald G.  
Cummings & Glenn W. Harrison, Was the Ohio Court Well Informed in Its Assessment of the 
Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method?, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1994). 
94 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (2000). 
95 Id. § 2706(c)(1)-(2). 
96 Id. § 2706(d)(3). 
97 Id. § 2706(e). 
98 See Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration as the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage 
to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430, 430 (1991). 
99 See Marguerite Holloway, Trends in Environmental Technology:  Soiled Shores, SCI. 
AM., Oct. 1991, at 102, 103 (noting that the oil spill “tore off the veil of preparedness 
worn by U.S. industry and by federal and local governments.  Technology proved un-
able to contain or contend with the spill, and it is likely to prove inadequate again”). 
100 15 C.F.R. § 990 (2006).  These rules were largely upheld in General Electric Co. v. 
Department of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  The court found the Ohio 
ruling decisive regarding the general legitimacy of contingent valuation.  Any claims 
that a particular contingent valuation was performed without adequate safeguards 
could be addressed in a later enforcement proceeding.  Id. at 773-74. 
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These compensation schemes for natural resources provide some 
valuable lessons.  Compensation should not be limited to losses that 
may be measured in markets.  Rather, the cost of restoring natural re-
sources (or providing substitutes) is a plausible default measure.  
Where restoration or substitution becomes impossible, contingent 
valuation may operate as an alternative measure of damages.  Direct 
economic losses are also compensable, but not more remote eco-
nomic harms such as higher prices to consumers.  By allowing the use 
of contingent valuation as a method for measuring harm, the ap-
proach to compensation for environmental damage from toxic sub-
stances and petrochemicals goes well beyond what I propose with re-
spect to harm resulting from climate change. 
D.  Compensation for Natural Disasters 
Steps can be taken to limit the human impact of natural disasters.  
Nevertheless, harm to human life and property cannot be avoided 
completely.  This raises the question of compensation.  The legal sys-
tem provides a mix of several public and private sector methods for 
compensating victims of natural disasters.  Each of the methods that 
has been used to provide compensation has its limitations. 
The first method of compensation is private insurance.  However, 
the unavailability of insurance for catastrophic risks—due to expense 
or underwriting risks, the exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract 
from insurance policies, and the difficulty of handling very large 
numbers of claims—creates significant hurdles to privately insuring 
against losses caused by natural disasters.  The second method of 
compensation, litigation against responsible private parties, also has 
its limitations.  These include the need for proof of negligence or an-
other basis for liability, limits on the financial assets and insurance 
coverage of potential defendants, and other judicial doctrines limiting 
recovery.  Third, compensation might be obtained from the govern-
ment through various routes:  tort claims against federal or state gov-
ernments for negligence (subject to immunity defenses), claims under 
special compensation schemes established for particular disasters, and 
claims based on constitutional provisions requiring compensation for 
the taking (or in some states, damaging) of property.  As two astute 
observers of the compensation system explain: 
In the final analysis, the U.S. has what might well be termed a patchwork 
system for providing financial compensation for catastrophic loss:  partly 
tort, partly public social welfare benefit programs, and partly private in-
surance coverage (often mandated); in some instances federally-initiated 
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and in some instances at the behest of state government.  Inevitably, in 
such a multifaceted milieu, where the tendency has been to develop dis-
crete schemes in response to particularized categories of disasters (or 
rely on general welfare schemes that were enacted without disaster relief 
in mind), there will be ongoing fine-tuning of the system and a continu-
ing dialogue over the efficacy of the measures in place.  While the de-
scription of the U.S. system may not point to a single best model for de-
livering financial compensation for catastrophic harm in all 
circumstances, its very complexity indicates the variety of pathways that 
might be taken.
101
With respect to compensation for one type of natural disaster—
flooding—governments play an important role.  Although the federal 
government generally has no legal liability for failure of the flood con-
trol system even for negligence, it has often found itself in the posi-
tion of bailing out flood victims with various forms of disaster relief.  
The flood insurance program is intended both to regularize this prac-
tice and to provide incentives to municipalities and individuals to limit 
their risk of exposure.  The basics of flood insurance have been suc-
cinctly summarized by the Congressional Research Service: 
 In 1968, Congress created the NFIP [National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram] in response to the trend of development and redevelopment in 
flood-prone areas, the increasing damages caused by floods, and rising 
cost of taxpayer funded disaster relief for flood victims.  Today, the NFIP 
is among the nation’s largest domestic liabilities, along with the Social 
Security System and federal health programs such as medicare and 
medicaid. . . . Federal flood insurance is currently offered to home-
owner[s], renters, and business owners in over 20,000 participating 
communities that adopt and enforce floodplain management regula-
tions which conform to NFIP standards. 
. . . . 
 The NFIP serves two major functions:  underwriting flood insurance 
and leading floodplain management.  Various entities have specific roles 
to play under the NFIP.  The federal government assumes all liability for 
the insurance coverage, sets the rates, coverage limitations, and eligibil-
ity requirements, designates special flood hazard areas (SFHA) with the 
issuance of flood insurance rate maps (FIRMs) and provides grant fund-
ing for mitigation planning activities. . . . Finally local communities with 
jurisdiction over land use adopt, administer, and enforce floodplain de-
velopment regulations. 
 The NFIP does not operate on the traditional insurance definition of 
fiscal solvency; rather, it operates under a statutory mandate that premi-
ums on pre-FIRM structures—i.e., structures built before the issuance of 
101 Rabin & Bratis, supra note 41, at 356. 
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a FIRM or before 1975, whichever is later—must be reasonable and, if 
necessary, be subsidized.
102
Flood insurance presents a tricky set of problems.103  If it is priced 
too high, people simply fail to insure.  If it is priced too low, society in 
effect subsidizes individuals to build in high-risk areas.  Obviously, the 
solution is to price it “just right”—but finding the right price may not 
be easy, especially since there is no private market to use as a bench-
mark. 
Private insurance also presents distinctive issues.104  The insurance 
industry seems reluctant to provide coverage for large-scale natural 
disasters.  This reluctance may be in part because of the difficulty of 
assessing future risks, or because of the underwriting costs associated 
with maintaining large levels of reserve or reinsurance—not to men-
tion competition from various government-subsidized schemes.  In 
the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Florida established a backup 
fund for individuals who could not get private coverage, funded by as-
sessments of insurers.  (This bears some resemblance to the more fa-
miliar “designated risk” pool for car insurance.)  The number of pol-
icy holders dropped by over ninety percent in just a few years, but the 
remaining coverage still represented over $10 billion in exposure.  
Florida also offers reinsurance to private insurers at subsidized rates.105
Natural disaster compensation provides several key lessons for 
climate change.  Private insurance may be inadequate to deal with 
large-scale impacts as opposed to more localized harms.  Also, given 
the variety of institutional forms for providing compensation, we 
should not focus exclusively on the litigation system as a basis for 
compensation.  Because of the important role that insurance could 
play, the compensation system should focus on those harms that are 
not easily insurable (because they are too large, predictable, or wide-
spread). 
102 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE:  THE REPETITIVE LOSS 
PROBLEM 6-7 (June 30, 2005). 
103 For fuller discussion of issues relating to flood insurance, see DANIEL A. FARBER 
& JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW:  KATRINA AND BEYOND 178-85 (2006). 
104 For more in-depth coverage of issues relating to private insurance, see id. at 
185-92; PAYING THE PRICE:  THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL 
DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., 
1998); Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insur-
ance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:  LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 177-83, 190-
98 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006). 
105 For further discussion of the Florida programs, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 
41, at 345-47. 
  
1632 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1605 
 
E.  Reparations for Slavery and Racial Discrimination 
A very different setting for compensation involves claims for repa-
rations by the descendants of American slaves.  The reparations issue 
has given rise to vigorous scholarly debate.106  Some of the debate con-
cerns the application of private law theories of liability in this setting.  
More attention, however, has been given to broader policy issues, 
which are hotly disputed.  The argument for reparations is at heart a 
simple one.  We recognize today that slavery was one of the great 
crimes of history, followed by a long and shameful legacy of legalized 
discrimination.  These wrongs have never been fully acknowledged—
not even in the form of an explicit apology—nor has recompense 
been made.107  Opponents of reparations do not question the injustice 
of slavery and Jim Crow laws.  They do question whether reparations 
would represent a sensible response.  They see reparations as deeply 
divisive, increasing rather than healing racial divisions.  Opponents 
also fear that the quest for reparations will discourage African Ameri-
cans from assuming responsibility for their own futures.  Finally, critics 
raise a host of questions about how to calculate the damages for this 
past misconduct and how to distribute those damages to current gen-
erations of African Americans.108
Reparations have not yet gained widespread support (which may 
not be a promising sign for climate change compensation).  As Saul 
Levmore puts it, black reparations may be “as unlikely to material-
ize . . . as a renegotiation with current American Indians regarding the 
purchase of Manhattan Island long ago or as a recovery from present 
Southerners for the firing on Fort Sumter.”109  Indeed, public opinion 
106 For a sampling of viewpoints, see Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War over Repa-
rations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181 (2004); Hanoch Dagan et al., Introduction, 
Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1135 (2004); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177 (2004); Calvin 
Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 157 (2004); Michelle E. Lyons, Note, World Conference Against Racism:  New 
Avenues for Slavery Reparations?, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1235 (2002). 
107 Some of the key arguments for reparations are made in ROY L. BROOKS, ATONE-
MENT AND FORGIVENESS:  A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 119-63 (2004); An-
thony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community:  A Communitarian Defense of Black Repara-
tions, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 980-1012 (2000); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the 
Past:  New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 282-
85 (2003). 
108 These objections are discussed in Brophy, supra note 106, at 1201-03; Epstein, 
supra note 106, at 1191-92; and Massey, supra note 106, at 168. 
109 Saul Levmore, Privatizing Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2004). 
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polls show that only four percent of whites would support payment of 
compensation for slavery (as opposed to the two-thirds of blacks who 
would support such payments).110
Nevertheless, there are some precedents for reparations.  Florida 
paid survivors of the 1923 Rosewood Massacre $150,000 each and 
made substantial payments to the descendants of other victims.111  The 
United States paid roughly $800 million to Native Americans for 
wrongfully seized land as early as 1946, and, in 1998, it paid $1.65 bil-
lion to Japanese Americans wrongfully interned during World War 
II.112  The federal government also paid $9 million to African Ameri-
cans who were denied treatment for syphilis as part of the infamous 
Tuskegee experiments.113  In another gesture of political support, Cali-
fornia passed a statute requiring insurance companies to submit re-
cords of slaveholder insurance policies to a central registry.114  More 
recently, J.P. Morgan Chase apologized for the actions of its predeces-
sors in accepting slaves as collateral (and taking possession in some 
cases); the apology was accompanied by a $5 million pledge for black 
college students from Louisiana.115  Finally, in a notable recent opin-
ion, Judge Posner held that the majority of the plaintiffs, who were Af-
rican American slave descendants requesting damages from compa-
nies that had participated in slavery, lacked standing or were barred 
by the statute of limitations—but some claims, primarily those 
brought by “legal representatives” and those asserting consumer pro-
tection violations, did survive dismissal.116  Thus, at least a glimmer of 
hope may exist for public support of some kind of reparations pro-
gram.117
Some of the resistance to reparations might be muted through 
creative benefit systems.  Dean Levmore proposes a privatized repara-
110 Brophy, supra note 106, at 1184 tbl.2. 
111 Lyons, supra note 106, at 1243 (noting they payment of compensation to Afri-
can-Americans whose community “was burned to the ground by whites in 1923”). 
112 Levmore, supra note 109, at 1303 n.50. 
113 Id. 
114  Lyons, supra note 106, at 1264. 
115 Ashley M. Heher, Slave Descendants Attempt To Revive Reparations Suit, 
MSNBC.COM, Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15037694. 
116 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759-63 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
117  Charles Ogletree also cites municipal, state, and federal legislation addressing 
reparations.  Ogletree, supra note 107, at 280-81.  Moreover, as he points out, Congress 
waived the statute of limitations in a suit involving discrimination by the Department of 
Agriculture against black farmers in the South.  Id. at 303. 
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tions scheme that might avoid some of the political objections.  The 
scheme involves incentives for private financing—up to $10 billion—
for programs to compensate black World War II veterans for wartime 
discrimination and to encourage high school graduation.118  We might 
imagine a similar scheme to encourage support for individuals who 
have had to relocate after their previous homes have become unin-
habitable or risky due to climate change. 
In some of the recent debate over reparations, there seems to 
have been a shift in the rationale for reparation and the types of repa-
ration sought by advocates.  Some of the key goals are informational 
and symbolic:  to admit past wrongs and advance public understand-
ing.  In terms of actual compensation, the interest seems to be com-
munity centered rather than individualized, such that it becomes pos-
sible to think of affirmative action programs as a form of reparation.  
Also, some advocates place greater emphasis on social welfare than on 
the prevention of unjust enrichment or redress for injuries.119
One of the lessons of the reparations debate is that the passage of 
time makes compensation increasingly difficult.  Moral responsibility 
becomes diffused, and damages become progressively more difficult 
to trace.  Similarly, GHG emissions today may have harmful effects 
over many decades, but delaying compensation in the meantime 
would be a mistake:  compensation denied at any time is very likely to 
be compensation denied forever.  Thus, the compensation scheme 
should prefer ex ante measures of damages rather than waiting for 
harm to occur. 
Another lesson of the reparations debate is that “compensation” 
can serve a number of functions in addition to payments that redress 
identifiable injury.  By focusing attention on the moral responsibility 
of certain actors for the plight of other actors, it may also provide a 
way of fostering socially beneficial programs.  Thus, even if we do not 
adopt an explicit compensation system, trying to assign responsibility 
for harm to particular actors may be a useful exercise.  Also, we should 
consider a variety of methods for delivering compensation, not just 
cash payments. 
118  Levmore, supra note 109, at 1300-01. 
119 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 814 (2006) 
(proposing “an alternative vision of the moral basis of reparations claims” that focuses 
on legislative action rather than litigation). 
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F.  Toxic Torts 
A fairly natural analogy to climate change liability involves litiga-
tion over harm caused by exposure to toxic substances.  This litigation 
has been pursued vigorously, though with varied success.  In some 
ways, the failures are as instructive as the successes, in terms of identi-
fying the knotty issues that a compensation system should try to avoid 
as much as possible. 
In considering compensation for individuals exposed to toxic sub-
stances, we can begin by distinguishing between ex ante and ex post 
compensation.  Ex ante compensation provides redress for the exis-
tence of the risk before the risk has caused actual harm; ex post com-
pensation provides for redress after injury has occurred.  In the cli-
mate change setting, ex ante compensation would involve, for 
example, the cost of constructing flood defenses.  Ex post compensa-
tion would be assessed after the floods had actually occurred. 
1.  Claims for Ex Ante Compensation 
Ex ante claims for toxic torts come in several guises.  First, the 
plaintiff may have an existing physical injury but be faced with the 
threat that the condition may worsen.  Second, the plaintiff may have 
no existing injury or disease but may suffer an increased risk of devel-
oping a particular disease, such as cancer, in the future.  The prevail-
ing rule for cases in these two categories is that increased risk of de-
veloping a future disease is not compensable unless the plaintiff can 
establish that the probability of the future disease is greater than fifty 
percent.120  Third, because of the plaintiff’s susceptibility to disease, 
she may suffer present emotional distress, which may or may not be 
accompanied by physical manifestations.  This category is not very 
relevant for present purposes; it seems unlikely that compensation will 
be provided for the mental distress of contemplating future harms 
caused by climate change.  Finally, the plaintiff facing an enhanced 
risk of future serious illness may incur present and future medical ex-
penses for surveillance of the possible development of the disease.  
120 This rule has, however, met some criticism.  See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling & Cam-
eron Powers Hoffman, Tortious Toxics, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 73 
(2001) (explaining this probability rule and arguing that it “has hugely arbitrary and 
inequitable results”).  For example, in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 
396, 413 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), the court upheld damages for fear of cancer where 
the plaintiff already had asbestosis and had a greater than fifty percent likelihood of 
developing cancer. 
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This fourth category has received particular attention from the courts 
and is also especially relevant for our purposes. 
The prevailing approach to medical monitoring is illustrated by In 
re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.121  The Third Circuit held that a 
medical monitoring claimant must prove four elements: 
 1.  Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance 
through the negligent actions of the defendant. 
 2.  As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease. 
 3.  That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examina-
tions reasonably necessary. 
 4.  Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early de-
tection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.
122
In most medical monitoring cases, “litigants pursued or courts 
awarded the traditional common-law lump sum of monetary dam-
ages.”123  In a few toxic exposure cases, however, litigants have re-
quested, or courts have expressed their preference, that the defen-
dant “pay the expenses [of medical surveillance] on a periodic basis 
out of a court-supervised trust fund or similar mechanism.”124  Medical 
monitoring thus seems to be a form of ex ante compensation, since it 
is based on precautionary actions rather than on an assessment of ac-
tual physical harm. 
2.  Claims for Ex Post Compensation 
The largest damages result from claims of death or serious illness 
as a result of exposure to toxic substances.  These damage claims are 
also among the hardest to prove.  One of the most serious sets of 
problems relates to proof of causation.  It may be difficult to establish 
121 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990). 
122 Id. at 852. 
123 Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds:  The Periodic Payment of Fu-
ture Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 665 
(1992) (footnotes omitted). 
124 Id. at 666.  The leading case on medical surveillance is Ayers v. Township of Jack-
son, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987), which held that “the cost of medical surveillance is 
a compensable item of damages . . . where such surveillance to monitor the effect of 
exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary.”  For a case rejecting a cause 
of action for medical monitoring, see Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 
827, 828 (Ala. 2001), which held that Alabama law does not recognize a “distinct cause 
of action for medical monitoring in the absence of a manifest physical injury or ill-
ness.” 
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that a toxic substance is even capable of causing a specific disease, let 
alone that it actually caused that disease in one particular plaintiff.  
This question of general causation often involves difficult and only 
partially resolved scientific questions.125
Even when a general link between a disease and exposure to a 
substance has been established, it may be difficult to show that a par-
ticular individual’s disease was caused by exposure to that specific sub-
stance: 
 Epidemiological studies may establish that a substance can cause the 
type of harm suffered by a plaintiff, satisfying general causation.  But a 
plaintiff must still demonstrate that the particular harm was in fact the 
result of exposure to a given substance.  Epidemiological studies, how-
ever, can only attribute a proportion of the incidence of disease in a 
population to any particular source.  They are not designed to prove 
specific causation.  Specific causation requires a plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that particu-
lar plaintiff’s harm.  Many courts interpret the preponderance standard 
to require a relative risk ratio of 2.0 or greater—for example, a defen-
dant’s conduct more than doubled the plaintiff’s risk of injury. . . .  
Thus, if an epidemiological study indicates that exposure to a particular 
substance increases the incidence of a disease among those exposed by 
only forty percent, then a court will probably find that the plaintiff has 
failed to meet the burden of proving specific causation unless more di-
rect evidence is offered.
126
There is considerable scholarly support for a different approach 
to probabilistic harm.  Rather than providing full compensation for 
victims who have proven at least a fifty percent probability of causation 
and none for those who have not met that burden of proof, the new 
approach would provide proportional recovery to all victims.127  Thus, 
125 For a discussion of these issues in the context of risk assessment, see DANIEL A. 
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 68-81 (7th ed. 2006). 
126 Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort:  Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1449-50 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  For further discussion of 
this issue, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. b 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (discussing “[r]easonable inference and speculation 
in proving causation”); id. § 28 cmt. c (discussing “[t]oxic substances and disease”); id. 
§ 28 cmts. a–c reporters’ note. 
127 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell:  Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for 
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 883 (1982) (exploring a “‘reverse-Sindell’ 
doctrine,” in which “uncertainty lies not in the defendant class, but in the plaintiff 
class”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for 
Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 418 (1984) (arguing in favor of a 
system in which “the injury on which the victim of a catastrophic accident can base a 
tort suit is defined . . . as the impact or exposure that planted the seeds of the illness”); 
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of 
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if there is, for example, a sixty percent chance that a victim’s injury 
was caused by exposure to the toxic chemical, the victim would receive 
compensation for sixty percent of her loss.  Similarly, if the probability 
is only twenty percent, twenty percent of the loss would be com-
pensable. 
When there are classes of potential victims with varying degrees of 
risk, there is a strong theoretical argument for departing from propor-
tionality.  Rather, the optimal form of compensation in such cases may 
be to assess the defendant with the full expected harm caused by its 
actions, but to distribute the damages only to the most likely victims.128  
In this scheme, the classes with the highest risk level receive full com-
pensation, starting at the top with the class most at risk; the court then 
proceeds down the list, awarding compensation until the defendant 
has paid the full expected value of the harm.  This method maximizes 
the probability that the funds will go to redress injuries that were ac-
tually caused by the defendant, and it correspondingly minimizes the 
error cost that the funds will go to individuals whose harm was not in 
fact caused by the defendant.  The assumption is that with full infor-
mation we could identify the cases of actual harm; the goal is to con-
centrate compensation on the defendants who caused that harm. 
To take a simple example, suppose that there are two classes con-
taining equal numbers of injured individuals.  For members of the 
first class (Class 1), the probability that the injury was caused by the 
toxic exposure is 60%; for the second class (Class 2), the probability is 
40%.129  To minimize the risk of erroneously compensating someone 
who was not really a victim of the defendant’s actions, we should fully 
compensate members of Class 1 but provide no compensation to 
members of Class 2.  To see this, assume that we transfer a dollar of 
compensation from a member of Class 1 to a member of Class 2.  Do-
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 858 (1984) (arguing that “the tort system can-
not . . . do individualized justice in mass exposure cases under the conventional ap-
proach to causality”). 
128 The argument for this approach is developed in Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causa-
tion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987).  As David Kaye pointed out to me after that article 
appeared, the proof presented in the article is unnecessarily complicated.  A simpler 
argument, which could be easily formalized in mathematical terms, is presented in the 
text accompanying note 129.  Also, it should be noted, this solution assumes that the 
goal is to maximize the amount of funds reaching individuals who were actually 
harmed by the defendant.  If the goal instead is social insurance, a different system 
might be favored. 
129 The difference might arise because the members of the first class had higher 
exposures or greater vulnerability, or, alternatively, because the members of the sec-
ond class have a greater likelihood of acquiring the injury from some other source. 
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ing so decreases the probability that the dollar will go to someone ac-
tually harmed by the defendant from 60% to 40%.  Hence, payments 
to members of Class 2 would increase the error rate, and compensa-
tion therefore should be entirely focused on Class 1 claimants. 
If we assume that the median probability of harm across an entire 
group is 50%, then this argument provides support for the classic bur-
den of proof rule:  those who can show a 51% probability should re-
ceive compensation for all of their injuries, while those who cannot 
make the threshold showing should receive nothing.  Results differ 
from the classic burden of proof, however, when the median expected 
harm is not 50%.  For example, if the median harm is 30%, then vic-
tims with a probability of harm in excess of 30% should receive full 
compensation, while those with a probability of harm under 30% 
should get nothing. 
This model of liability suggests that it may be better to concentrate 
on full compensation for the most provable harms, rather than to 
spread funds over all possible victims.  Thus, this model provides indi-
rect support for the proposal in this Article that compensation should 
begin with the most workable subset of climate damages. 
3.  Apportionment Among Defendants 
Another problem in toxic tort litigation is establishing a link be-
tween a specific defendant and the release of the substance.  For ex-
ample, many hazardous waste generators may have shipped similar 
materials to the site in question.  Establishing ownership of the leaked 
containers or the quantities they leaked may be quite difficult.  A simi-
lar issue can arise in products liability cases.  In Sindell v. Abbott Labora-
tories, the plaintiff’s mother was administered the drug diethylstil-
besterol (DES) during pregnancy.130  Although DES was, at that time, 
routinely given to prevent miscarriage, it is now known to cause a rare 
form of cancer in some daughters of women who took the drug.  After 
developing that cancer, the plaintiff in Sindell sued eleven of the more 
than two hundred manufacturers of DES.131  Although the plaintiff 
was unable to identify the manufacturer of the particular DES product 
that her mother took, the court held that she had stated a cause of ac-
tion against manufacturers of the drug that all used an identical for-
130 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
131 Id. at 925-26. 
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mula.132  Resting this holding on a broad social policy, the court noted 
that the defendants were “better able to bear the cost of injury result-
ing from the manufacture of a defective product.”133  The Sindell court 
then adopted a novel theory of liability by making each defendant li-
able for a share of the plaintiff’s damages, based on the particular de-
fendant’s share of the DES market.134  Sindell has been followed by a 
number of other courts, with some variations.135
It is obviously impossible to link any specific GHG emissions with 
any specific injury, due to the cumulative nature of the greenhouse 
effect.  Thus, some form of Sindell-like apportionment seems to be the 
only workable solution. 
Toxic tort litigation illustrates the ways in which compensation ef-
forts can be frustrated when ex post remedies require difficult inquir-
ies into causation.  Ex ante remedies such as medical monitoring 
avoid many of these issues.  On the other hand, tort litigation has had 
some success, particularly in terms of substances like asbestos, which 
involve large-scale, frequently documented impacts. 
III.  CORE COMPENSATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
With the lessons of these analogous compensation systems in 
mind, I turn to the problem of constructing a compensation system 
for climate change.  The proposal presented here is not particularly 
ambitious.  It limits itself to the most predictable forms of harm and 
favors the use of the most easily administered measures of damages.  
Given, however, that no system of compensation exists currently, it 
seems best to begin with a system that addresses the core of the prob-
lem, bearing in mind that even a modest effort at compensation may 
be politically infeasible. 
The proposed definition of compensable climate injuries is based 
on lessons from other compensation systems.  In order to avoid diffi-
cult causation inquiries, time lags before compensation, and problems 
of proof, the proposal stresses ex ante measures of damages such as 
replacement or substitution costs.  It focuses on widespread harms 
that likely will be capable of standardized assessment, as opposed to 
132 Id. at 928. 
133 Id. at 936. 
134 Id. at 936-37. 
135 A good review of the early cases can be found in In re “Agent Orange” Product 
Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 820-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).  Note that the most suc-
cessful use of the doctrine has been in the highly unusual DES cases. 
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highly individualized damage from climate change.  Finally, it is ame-
nable to implementation in a number of institutional forms. 
A.  Policies Favoring Compensation for Climate Damages 
The tort system—and, by extension, other compensation 
schemes—has several goals.136  Probably the two most important are 
deterring harmful conduct (the efficiency or deterrence rationale) 
and corrective justice (that is, restoring moral balance by rectifying 
harm).  Loss distribution (which can be considered a way of providing 
insurance against social risks) is another goal, perhaps more impor-
tant in social compensation schemes than in tort.  A final set of goals 
is oriented to society as a whole:  providing redress for social griev-
ances or exhibiting social solidarity with victims.137
Corrective justice involves complex moral issues that are not likely 
to be resolved simply or to everyone’s satisfaction.138  Emissions of 
GHGs were not made with the intent to cause harm to others.  Prior 
to the last quarter of the twentieth century, emitters may not have had 
strong grounds for believing that their conduct would cause serious 
harm.  Nevertheless, the fact remains that they have caused harm, and 
in the process they have enjoyed lower costs than they would have in-
curred by using alternative technologies or by reducing output.  Thus, 
there is a strong element of unjust enrichment, at least in some situa-
tions.  For those concerned about culpability, apportioning responsi-
bility on the basis of emissions after some cutoff date would be an ap-
propriate response.  One possible cutoff date is 1992, when the 
United States and other nations entered a framework agreement to 
reduce GHGs.139  At that point, the international community had 
136 For a general discussion of the tort system’s goals, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, 
THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14-20 (2d ed. 2002). 
137 For an insightful discussion of this solidarity rationale in the context of catas-
trophic natural events, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles of Government in Compensating 
Disaster Victims,  ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2007, art. 1, at 28-31, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art1. 
138 Matthew Adler’s thoughtful commentary on this Article explores these issues in 
more depth.  His analysis suggests that the climate change situation may be an imper-
fect fit with philosophical theories of corrective justice, although it appears that the 
philosophical case for compensation at the international level seems stronger than at 
the local level.  See Matthew D. Adler, Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1865-67 (2007). 
139 See Brown, supra note 3, at 10,741 (analyzing “the extent to which the United 
States has advanced in meeting sustainable development commitments made in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992”). 
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clearly identified the harm; any source of emissions after that date was 
at least on notice of the damaging nature of the conduct. 
It may be premature to make a judgment about the culpability of 
GHG emitters.  At the very least, it seems arguable that at some point 
it became negligent not to take reasonable precautionary measures to 
reduce emissions.  Given the amount of misinformation that has been 
spread by industry-sponsored groups, as well as efforts within the U.S. 
government during the past six years to suppress information, there is 
also at least the possibility of deliberate misrepresentations, as turned 
out to be the case in the tobacco industry concerning the risks of ciga-
rettes.140  At this point, it is impossible to know whether there was a de-
liberate campaign of deception, but pre-trial discovery in one of the 
nuisance cases, or intensive congressional hearings on related issues, 
might shed light on the subject.  Given the amount of money to be 
gained in some industries by forestalling any serious response to cli-
mate change, it would not be surprising to discover cases of deliberate 
deception of the public or improper pressure on governments. 
In terms of the deterrence goal of compensation, it is obviously 
impossible to deter conduct that has already taken place.  Neverthe-
less, establishing a rule that requires compensation for past emissions 
can provide a precedent for future liability schemes that cover other 
emerging environmental harm.  For example, the fear that another 
country might emulate CERCLA liability provides an incentive for 
care in disposing of hazardous waste, even if that country in which 
disposal occurs does not currently have a stringent regulatory scheme.  
Thus, the possibility of retroactive liability can provide useful incen-
tives to avoid novel forms of harmful conduct.141  In the absence of 
140 Consider, for example, a memo leaked from the American Petroleum Institute 
about a campaign to indoctrinate science students and teachers about the alleged un-
certainties of climate research in order to impede efforts such as Kyoto.  See Laurie 
David, Science a la Joe Camel:  An Inconvenient Truth About One American Teachers Associa-
tion, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2006, at C4 (describing the American Petroleum Institute’s 
efforts to tout its environmental track record while challenging global warming).  No-
tably, the National Science Teachers’ Association declined to distribute copies of Al 
Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth because it considered the film to be “political” and be-
cause doing so might imperil the association’s capital campaign.  ExxonMobil has 
been a strong supporter of the association.  Id. 
141 It is also arguable that the liability would not be truly retroactive.  As the Re-
statement drafters note, the “abnormally dangerous doctrine has a significant applica-
tion in the context of environmental harms,” including application to activities, such as 
toxic waste handling, that are not at all uncommon in our economy.  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 cmt. k reporters’ note (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1 2005).  Applying strict liability to the production of GHGs arguably 
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such a liability threat, when new environmental issues arise, those 
producing the harms will assume that they have a free ride until a li-
ability scheme that deals specifically with the new problem is put into 
effect.  This would discourage early efforts to reduce harmful con-
duct.142  Thus, a general policy of retroactive liability for environ-
mental harm might have valuable deterrent effects. 
This deterrence rationale has some inherent limitations.  The de-
terrence rationale clearly does not apply before the point when the 
harmful nature of the conduct could reasonably have been discov-
ered, and it applies with the greatest force to activities whose harmful 
nature has already become clear.  Moreover, once an effective regula-
tory scheme is in place, liability for further emissions may not serve a 
useful deterrent function.  But potential liability may provide useful 
incentives in the period between the discovery of the harmful envi-
ronmental effect and the implementation of an appropriate regula-
tory scheme. 
Loss distribution seems to be most significant in two situations:  
(1) where the precise incidence of the harm is unknown, but the pri-
vate market cannot provide insurance (the insurance function); and 
(2) where the victims of harm are markedly poorer than those causing 
the harm (income redistribution).  The income redistribution func-
tion is probably strongest at the international level, where relatively 
affluent nations, like the United States, are heavy emitters, and im-
pacted victims are poorer countries, such as Bangladesh.  As the Stern 
Review says, 
[t]he poorest in society are likely to have the least capacity to adapt . . . . 
Given that the greatest need for adaptation will be in low-income coun-
tries, overcoming financial constraints is also a key objective.  This will 
involve transfers from rich countries to poor countries.  The argument is 
strongly reinforced by the historical responsibility of rich countries for 
could be justified on this basis, or on the basis of public nuisance law (as invoked in 
People ex rel. Lockyer v. General Motors Corp., discussed supra note 34 and accompanying 
text). 
142 These concerns suggest an alternative way of measuring damages.  Under sec-
tion 120(d)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7420(d)(2) (2000), air polluters are 
assessed a penalty for noncompliance in the amount of the economic value of non-
compliance.  Regulations implementing this provision were upheld in Duquesne Light 
Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  By removing this economic benefit, 
the noncompliance penalty eliminates the incentive to delay compliance and also pre-
vents firms from obtaining an unfair advantage over competitors who have chosen to 
comply promptly.  By analogy, entities that have failed to take timely steps to reduce 
GHG emissions could be assessed on the basis of the economic benefits they have at-
tained from the delay. 
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the bulk of accumulated stocks of GHGs.  Poor countries are suffering 
and will suffer from climate change generated in the past by consump-
tion and growth in rich countries.
143
The insurance function is probably most appropriate for the 
harms caused by extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, in which 
the victims’ identities are inherently unpredictable.  The case for in-
surance is weaker when harms are more predictable, such as the im-
pact of graduated sea level changes on coastal areas. 
Finally, the societal aspects of compensation must be considered.  
Within the United States, at least, there is some argument for express-
ing solidarity with fellow citizens who are suffering distinct harm be-
cause of widespread national practices.  For some, a similar sense of 
solidarity may extend more globally.  The potential social conflicts re-
sulting from climate change also need to be considered.  Individuals 
who suffer loss or displacement due to climate change are likely to be 
angry and resentful.  This effect could be potentially destabilizing in 
some parts of the world, posing threats to international and U.S. secu-
rity.  Within the United States, such effects are likely to be more 
muted, but could still lead to political animosity and polarization. 
It is also worth noting that the United States and other countries 
have already agreed in principle to take some responsibility for adap-
tation measures in less developed countries.  Article 4.4 of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states that “de-
veloped country Parties and other developed Parties included in An-
nex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particu-
larly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting 
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.”144  Article 4.1(e) also calls 
on countries to “[c]ooperate in preparing for adaptation to the im-
pacts of climate change”; countries are also directed to “develop and 
elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone manage-
ment, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and re-
habilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and 
desertification, as well as floods.”145  This cooperation mandate 
amounts to a requirement of in-kind contribution to adaptation 
measures.  Thus, at least in principle, the United States and other sig-
natories to the framework agreement already seem to have agreed to 
143 STERN, supra note 1, at 37. 
144 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4.4, May 9, 1992, available 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
145 Id. art. 4.1(e). 
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compensation at the international level.  It is also worth noting that 
the parties to the Kyoto agreement have embraced the use of an adap-
tation fund, which is financed by a share of the proceeds generated by 
the Clean Development Mechanism.146
On balance, there seems to be a good case for climate change 
compensation—assuming that a reasonably efficient compensation 
mechanism can be designed.  Clearly, some people have profited from 
the absence of GHG limitations well after the need for such limits be-
came clear.  Their conduct will cause long-term harm to others.  In 
order to provide redress to the victims and provide an incentive for 
care in dealing with other emerging environmental problems, com-
pensation is warranted.  The argument for compensation seems to be 
strongest as applied to conduct that takes place after the harms of cli-
mate change are identified (so that emitters are on notice) but before 
effective regulatory controls are in place (which would itself create de-
terrence). 
Although compensation is supported by some strong policy argu-
ments, one serious concern needs to be addressed.  That concern is 
that emphasizing compensation poses the risk of undermining efforts 
to mitigate and adapt to climate change.  This interference could stem 
from either political or economic factors. 
One political concern is that compensation claims could be polar-
izing, making it more difficult to reach agreements on mitigation 
measures.  It may be hard enough to get emitters to agree to future 
restrictions without also requiring them to accept liability for past 
conduct.  This effect is not implausible, but it does seem rather specu-
lative.  It seems equally likely that the potential availability of compen-
sation would drive emitters to the bargaining table earlier, discourag-
ing them from holding out over mitigation measures.  Alternatively, 
the availability of compensation might reduce pressure from victims 
for stringent mitigation measures that emitters find unacceptable—
thereby smoothing negotiations. 
A related economic issue involves the potential effect of large 
transfer payments.  It is not possible to calculate the full harm caused 
by climate change, but there is no doubt that it involves a very large 
amount of money.  Diverting massive financial resources to compensa-
146 See Dean Scott, U.N. Climate Talks Make Some Progress on Adaptation, Joint Imple-
mentation, 29 INT’L ENV’T. REP. 867, 867 (2006) (explaining that the adaptation fund 
agreement “lays the groundwork for project funds to begin flowing to developing na-
tions”). 
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tion might leave too little for adaptation or mitigation.  This is a po-
tentially serious concern, but there are several ways of dealing with it. 
First, it might not make sense to try to provide complete compen-
sation for climate-related harms.  The wider the sphere of com-
pensable harms, the greater the problems of proof and the greater the 
administrative expense of providing compensation.  This is one argu-
ment for at least beginning with a more manageable set of harms.  
Moreover, restricting the set of compensable harms also serves to keep 
the scope of liability within manageable limits.  In addition, it may 
prevent politically and socially disruptive effects such as widespread 
bankruptcies or plant closings. 
Second, in terms of adaptation, the easiest way to prevent com-
pensation payments from causing interference is by tying compensa-
tion to adaptation projects.  For example, possible adaptations for 
harms relating to sea level change could include building sea walls, 
where appropriate, or providing substitute wetlands through restora-
tion projects.  One precedent for this approach is provided by the 
UNCC compensation system discussed earlier.147  Creating such a tie 
ensures that funds are not diverted from needed adaptation measures 
into current consumption. 
Third, in terms of mitigation, there may be ways to ensure that 
compensation does not detract from emissions reduction or other 
measures, such as the creation of carbon sinks.  If mitigation is 
achieved through a cap-and-trade system, we might want to provide 
compensation by reallocating some emissions allowances from emit-
ters to victims.  Victims would receive financial compensation by sell-
ing allowances, which emitters would have to acquire for compliance 
purposes.148
Thus, the potential for interference with forward-looking meas-
ures seems to be manageable by restricting the class of compensable 
harms and carefully designing payment mechanisms.  Putting this is-
sue aside, the case for compensation is at its strongest when (1) emit-
ters are on notice of the harmful nature of their conduct, (2) an op-
timum regulatory scheme is not in place at the time of the emissions, 
(3) the class of compensable harms is not so broad as to create over-
whelming financial burdens, (4) claimants do not have the benefit of 
147 See supra Part II.B. 
148 If a carbon tax is the primary form of emissions control, then compensation 
could be financed from the tax revenues, or emitters could be given a tax offset for 
compensation payments. 
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private or social insurance, (5) victims are significantly poorer than 
emitters, and (6) the payment system is tied to the systems for mitiga-
tion and adaptation.  This is not to say that these are necessary condi-
tions or that an ideal compensation system would not be substantially 
broader.  These parameters do, however, seem to identify the most fa-
vorable circumstances for compensation. 
Some readers may remain unconvinced that compensation is war-
ranted even when all or most of the six conditions are met.  Those 
readers should, however, agree with the judgment that these condi-
tions present the strongest cases for compensation on a relative scale, 
even if they do not cross the threshold of acceptability on an absolute 
scale.  Skeptical readers should regard the remainder of this Article as 
the answer to a hypothetical question:  if we did want to adopt a sys-
tem for compensating climate change, what would be the optimal 
characteristics of that system? 
B.  Defining Core Compensable Harm 
The definition of compensable harm has several objectives.  It 
should minimize the problems of proof and proximate cause that 
plague toxic torts cases.  It should also be broad enough to provide 
significant relief to victims, but not so all encompassing as to create 
overwhelming financial burdens and thereby distract from climate 
change mitigation or other desirable social goals.  A compensation 
system will also be more acceptable to the extent that it adopts fea-
tures of existing compensation schemes. 
Given these goals, one desirable measure of harm is based on rea-
sonable monitoring and adaptation expenditures.  Awarding compen-
sation for such preventive measures is supported by the following 
sources:  U.S. toxic tort law as it relates to medical monitoring ex-
penses;149 UNCC practice, in its use of adaptation measures and the 
cost of providing alternate ecosystem services;150 and the preference 
for replacement damages under CERCLA and other schemes.151
Using restoration, adaptation, and precaution as the default 
measures of damages also avoids the difficulty of determining, ex post, 
whether an injury to a particular claimant was the result of climate 
change.  It is easier to show that increases in extreme weather events 
149 See supra Part II.F.1. 
150 See supra Part II.B. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 71-100. 
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require higher levees than it is to show that a particular house was 
damaged in a flood due to climate change.  As the U.S. toxic tort cases 
show, it is difficult to assess causation in the presence of scientific un-
certainty. 
These measures of damages also focus compensation in the areas 
where harm is most foreseeable, and hence on the entities that are 
most likely to be victims.  As discussed earlier in connection with toxic 
torts, compensating the most likely victims rather than spreading 
compensation across all possible victims minimizes error costs.152  If we 
identify adaptation projects required by climate change, we can be 
confident about entitlement to compensation in a way that is unlikely 
where ex post damages are concerned. 
C.  Possible Institutional Forms 
The primary purpose of this Article is to identify the types of inju-
ries that should be given priority in compensating for climate change.  
A further question is, what sort of institutional framework should be 
used for assessing damages, awarding compensation, and funding the 
awards?  A detailed discussion of this question is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  It is important to observe, however, that there are several 
possible institutional frameworks.  Hence, it should not be assumed 
that compensation will be delivered through damage awards from law-
suits or some other specific mechanism.  Each of the potential 
mechanisms has advantages and disadvantages. 
1.  Litigation 
Litigation is the most obvious way to procure compensation.  
Claims in the U.S. courts involving damage to natural resources, 
whether based on tort law or statutes such as CERCLA, provide one 
possible model for such a system. 
At present, international tribunals are unlikely to be able to com-
pel payment of large judgments, even if they take jurisdiction.  Do-
mestic courts have greater coercive power.  They may be able to han-
dle some international disputes, assuming defendants are local 
nationals or have sufficient local assets to be within the court’s juris-
diction and amenable to meaningful relief.  They may also be natural 
forums for domestic compensation disputes. 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 128-129. 
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The great advantages of courts are their political independence, 
their obligation to make principled decisions, and their engagement 
with concrete disputes over injuries.  Ideally, these characteristics may 
allow courts to make socially desirable decisions that the political sys-
tem is unable to produce.  The major disadvantages of courts are their 
lower degree of democratic legitimacy, their possible reluctance to 
engage in large-scale innovation, and their inability to produce a 
comprehensive compensation system. 
Realistically, the greatest function of litigation may be to prod leg-
islative action.  A number of legislative compensation schemes, such as 
the 9/11 fund, seem to have come into existence as a way of forestal-
ling litigation against key private entities. 
2.  Administrative Adjudication 
A legislatively established administrative system would offer several 
advantages over courts.153  It could operate under a more comprehen-
sive set of rules.  In addition, transaction costs could be lower because 
agency expertise would produce more efficient decisions.  It might 
also be easier for an agency to produce standardized protocols and 
payment schedules, which would simplify the adjudicatory process. 
One model for such an administrative process would be the 
UNCC.  As described earlier, the UNCC handled adjudication of envi-
ronmental damage claims after the first Gulf War.154  It seems to have 
handled the claims reasonably efficiently and with general procedural 
fairness. 
An administrative system would also have disadvantages, however.  
First, such a system would require legislative action (or an interna-
tional treaty), which might not be forthcoming or could be flawed by 
interest group politics.  Second, administrative compensation systems 
seem to have difficulty remaining current in terms of compensation 
levels.  Third, greater efficiency will probably result in less accurate 
decision making in individual cases.  Finally, the adjudicatory process 
might be subject to political pressure, making decisions unreliable. 
153 The issues involved in designing such a system are discussed in Robert L. 
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 
52 MD. L. REV. 951, 964-78 (1993).  Additionally, a sketch of one such system is offered 
in the Introduction to this Article. 
154 See supra Part II.B. 
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3.  Grants 
Rather than relying on adjudication, a compensation system could 
be based on an assessment system against responsible parties in order 
to establish a fund, which would then be disbursed in a grant-making 
process.  Such a fund could be established as a litigation settlement, 
through legislative, administrative, or international processes, or even 
through voluntary action.  For example, countries with high emissions 
could make payments to the World Bank, which could then make 
grants to finance adaptation measures elsewhere in the world.  In the 
private sector, individual businesses or groups of like-minded busi-
nesses with high emissions histories could make similar grants, per-
haps with some government encouragement in the form of favorable 
tax treatment. 
These grants would not need to be accompanied by any admission 
of liability, but could instead be considered a voluntary acceptance of 
responsibility for past acts.  Such actions might resemble the kind of 
reparations sought by some advocates for past activities, such as cor-
porate complicity with slavery.155  There are obviously limits to how 
much we can expect in the way of voluntary action, but it is easy to 
imagine various motivations beyond ethical responsiveness that might 
be operative.  Such additional motivations might include the desire to 
project a good image to customers (or voters) and employees, to es-
tablish friendly relations with countries and communities suffering 
damage from climate change, and to forestall coercive compensation 
efforts (or at least accumulate credits against later compensation de-
mands).156
The disadvantage of the grant system is that it decouples financial 
contributions from determinations of damages.  Contributions are 
likely to be based primarily on either their acceptability to the gran-
tors or as part of a deal between grantors and grantees.  Total pay-
ments probably would fall well short of compensable harm.  More-
155 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 115. 
156 One feature of the compensation system that has to be addressed is whether 
voluntary transfers should offset compensation requirements.  It seems plausible that 
they should, but it may be difficult to define precisely which payments count as suffi-
ciently related to specific compensable harms.  Relatedly, the “collateral source” issue 
needs to be addressed:  to what extent do payments from third parties offset compen-
sation that would otherwise be due?  For example, it is not clear whether, to the extent 
insurance is available for compensable harms, the insurance should be an offset, or 
whether, on the other hand, the insurance company should just subrogate to the rights 
of the insured. 
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over, any incentive effect is likely to be lost; the parties most in need 
of an incentive to mitigate emissions are also probably the least likely 
to make voluntary contributions.  Another risk of decoupling is shown 
by the United States’s bio-prevention compensation scheme (PREPA), 
which lacks guaranteed funding.157  On the other hand, decoupling 
produces a less adversarial process for issuing funds, which could lead 
to faster relief for the injured parties. 
An advantage of the grant system is that it could be directed at the 
victims with the greatest need—those with the fewest resources and 
the most urgency to adapt.  From a social welfare perspective, pay-
ments to those victims would produce the greatest benefit without the 
expense of attempting to deal with less urgent compensation cases. 
4.  Declaratory Relief 
Strictly speaking, declaratory relief is not a compensation system 
at all, but there is something to be said for at least establishing a trust-
worthy system for assessing core damages and allocating responsibility 
to emitters, even in the absence of any provision for payment.  Such a 
system would put pressure on emitters to engage in voluntary transfer 
payments.  It would also help highlight and particularize the harm 
done by climate change, thereby encouraging the adoption of mitiga-
tion measures.  Also, to use a phrase currently en vogue in Washing-
ton, it might at least produce a degree of “moral clarity” about re-
sponsibility for harm. 
In the field of reparations, such allocations of responsibility take 
the form of truth commissions, such as that in South Africa.  Some 
people believe that, by acknowledging the existence of victimhood 
and responsibility, such truth commissions can play a socially integra-
tive role, paving the way for a more just society.158
Because anger at GHG emissions is not likely to be targeted at par-
ticular individuals, some of the reparative functions of truth commis-
sions are unlikely to be served.  Moreover, individual victims will not 
be easily identifiable.  Thus, the “truth commission” idea may not have 
157 See supra note 53. 
158 For discussions of truth commissions and their role in transitional justice, see 
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:  FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 57 (1998) (“If the goal of healing individuals and soci-
ety after the trauma of mass atrocity is elevated, truth commissions could well be a bet-
ter option than prosecutions.”); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, 
AND THE LAW 271 (1997) (listing truth commissions as one of several ways that states 
can respond to a “popular upsurge of demand for the facts”). 
  
1652 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1605 
the same potential for healing as advocates claim it has in some other 
contexts.  Nevertheless, identifying responsibility for burdens placed 
on other regions may still be helpful in setting the stage for negotia-
tions or other compensation mechanisms. 
D.  Contributory Fault and Related Issues 
Nearly everyone on the planet, in some small way, contributes to 
the generation of GHGs.  Some contribute more than others, but in 
nearly every case, it is at least possible to imagine that the claimant’s 
personal conduct might be used as a basis for avoiding or reducing 
compensation.  In other words, the claimant’s own activities may be 
relevant to the availability or amount of compensation.  This argu-
ment can play out in several different ways. 
1.  Contributory Fault 
In some situations, the injured parties will themselves have made 
significant contributions to causing climate change.  This is unlikely to 
be true for the poorest of communities, which lack the resources to 
produce high levels of GHGs.  But especially for claims within the 
United States, such contributions to climate change should be taken 
into account. 
In practice, this should not be difficult to do.  The percentage of 
world GHG emissions produced by the claimant could be used as a 
multiplier, with that proportion of the compensation claim being re-
duced.  Alternatively, the deduction could be based on the amount of 
emissions over the optimum control level for the claimant, so that 
claimants who took feasible steps to reduce emissions would receive a 
greater reward.  Except for the very largest emitters, it should make 
little difference which offset is used, since the claimant’s emissions will 
be insignificant compared to the global level.  Even a claimant who 
produced a very large amount of GHGs—say ten percent of the world 
total—would receive ninety percent payment on claims. 
Simply to reduce administrative costs, it might be useful to pre-
clude claims by large emitters whose share of GHGs is larger than 
their share of climate damages.  Doing so would tend to eliminate 
cases in which major emitters are simply passing funds around be-
tween each other at some administrative expense.  Such a rule would 
be analogous to a common variant of the contributory fault system in 
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the United States in which parties who are more than fifty percent at 
fault for an accident cannot recover.159  At the international level, for 
example, claims between the United States and China might be 
largely offsetting, and hence it might be easier simply to eliminate 
them from consideration. 
There are several arguments against eliminating claims by large 
emitters.  First, there might be considerable dispute about where to 
draw the line.  Second, emitters of equal size might not be equally at 
fault.  Third, one emitter might be much more vulnerable to climate 
change than the other, so the damages would not be offsetting.  On 
balance, having a special rule for large emitters is probably not advis-
able, but the problem deserves further consideration. 
2.  Offsets for Climate Change Benefit 
Climate change is likely to produce local benefits in some regions 
in the form of less rigorous winters, more optimal levels of precipita-
tion, or longer growing seasons.  Should there be an offset for such 
benefits in the compensation system? 
The answer is probably no, because the compensation system cov-
ers only a portion of damages.  The core compensation system pro-
posed in this Article excludes many kinds of damages, but even a 
compensation system that attempted to be comprehensive would be 
very unlikely to provide full compensation.  The costs of climate 
change are simply too systemic and difficult to trace.  Hence, whatever 
benefits are obtained from climate change may well be countered by 
uncompensated damages.  Given the additional problems of proof 
and administrative costs in establishing offsets for climate change 
benefits, the case for doing so appears weak.  A perfect system would 
surely include all costs and all benefits experienced by the claimants, 
but such a system is probably too complex to be manageable.  A better 
solution is to provide full compensation for a subset of harms, while 
assuming that the remaining harms are likely to be at least as high as 
any benefits.  It might be worthwhile, however, to exclude claimants 
that have experienced significant net benefits from climate change.  
159 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 25 cmt. d 
reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (“[M]any states . . . have adopted 
comparative responsibility in a modified form, pursuant to which the plaintiff’s con-
tributory negligence continues to operate as a full defense if it is greater than the de-
fendant’s negligence.”). 
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Those entities could be reasonably expected to use their benefits as a 
source of funding for adaptation measures. 
3.  Moral Hazard 
As the U.S. flood insurance program indicates, one unfortunate 
side effect of a compensation scheme can be to reduce the incentive 
for risk-avoiding behavior.160  Similarly, a compensation system could 
reduce incentives to relocate vulnerable populations, or it could lead 
to overinvestment in preventive measures, such as sea walls to combat 
sea level change.  One possible solution, which was attempted in the 
flood insurance program, is to couple compensation with acceptance 
of regulatory restrictions.  This has been, at best, a partial success.161
Another option is to impose a duty to mitigate damages on in-
jured parties.  This would involve making an independent assessment 
of whether mitigation measures are reasonably necessary in light of 
alternatives or whether the injured party unduly exposed itself to risk.  
The UNCC process provides a model here.162  In principle, this system 
provides a complete solution.  In practice, of course, it increases the 
complexity and expense of proceedings, as well as the risk of error. 
Dealing with moral hazard problems is part of the larger question 
of how to efficiently establish damages.  In an administrative setting, 
the best solution might be to devise a schedule of presumptive adapta-
tion expenses, and to give a limited opportunity for either side to in-
troduce evidence of special circumstances. 
4.  Proof of Damages 
Individualized proof of damages may be complex and difficult, 
especially if the proof requirement includes evidence of mitigation.  
One response would be to create a schedule of damages, as was done 
with the 9/11 fund.163  This would provide for a standardized method 
of assessing, for example, the value of property lost to sea level rise, 
the reasonable cost of additional levees and sea walls, or the cost of 
160 See supra text accompanying note 103.  In the case of flood insurance, too much 
insurance may lead to undesirable construction in flood-prone areas. 
161 Concerns about the effectiveness of the regulations are discussed in Congres-
sional Research Service, supra note 102, at 19-24. 
162 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52. 
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providing compensating benefits through wetlands creation.  It would 
also address the mitigation issue discussed above. 
In practice, such scheduling seems necessary because of the high 
number of damage claims.  A damages schedule is unlikely to be per-
fectly accurate, because it will reflect a compromise between precision 
and administrability.  As a result, it may lead to under- or overcom-
pensation.  Either mistake has clear fairness implications, and might 
also create insufficient incentives for emissions controls or some de-
gree of moral hazard for victims.  But workability is probably more 
important in this context than precision. 
There is a natural tendency to want to fine tune the system in or-
der to come as close as possible to the optimum level of compensa-
tion.  This would be a mistake.  Determining exactly the right level of 
compensation in every case would be extremely expensive and time 
consuming.  It would waste expertise that could be more usefully em-
ployed to design mitigation and adaptation measures.  It would also 
probably delay compensation to the point of diminishing its value to 
victims.  It is better to have a rough and ready system of compensation 
that provides at least partial justice and operates efficiently. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article assumes that GHG emissions will have damaging cli-
matic effects.  Even given the improbable assumption that the world 
will adopt an optimal policy to mitigate further emissions, some harm-
ful impacts are unavoidable.  Whether to provide compensation for 
these damages is a complex, difficult question, as is how to design a 
system for doing so.  This Article makes no claim to have settled these 
issues.  Rather, my goal has been to provide some context for consid-
ering the issues, to indicate something about the range of possible so-
lutions, and to put forward one possible model for awarding compen-
sation. 
The proposed model focuses on the impact of climate change on 
geographic features such as coastlines, wetlands, glaciers, permafrost, 
rivers, and lakes.  Widespread impacts on these features are already 
underway, so these effects are far from speculative.  As a preferred 
measure of damages, I suggest the cost of remedial measures such as 
monitoring, protecting, restoring, or providing substitutes for existing 
resources.  There is precedent for such ex ante measures of damages 
in U.S. laws governing oil spills and hazardous waste releases, in the 
United Nations Compensation Commission’s effort to provide com-
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pensation for environmental harm after the first Gulf War, and in 
medical monitoring recoveries in toxic torts laws. 
The alternative to this ex ante compensation is to provide com-
pensation ex post, based on proof of actual damages from changes in 
climate and weather.  One difficulty with this alternative is that it 
spreads compensation over decades, if not centuries.  Another is that 
it raises difficult issues of causation and complicated problems of 
valuation.  The ex ante approach delivers compensation earlier, more 
efficiently, and with less uncertainty. 
Such a scheme could be implemented in many institutional forms.  
It could be the basis for liability determinations by domestic courts or 
international tribunals.  Alternatively, an administrative compensation 
scheme might be used.  The system could be given a more voluntary 
dimension through agreements by responsible parties to finance 
grants for remedial measures (perhaps as litigation settlements or with 
the encouragement of either tax benefits or subsidies). 
This is a fairly modest proposal, firmly grounded in existing com-
pensation practices.  It leaves unaddressed many other forms of injury 
from climate change.  But the difficulties of establishing any compen-
sation system at all are formidable.  It is better to begin with some-
thing unambitious and manageable than to aim for a possibly unat-
tainable ideal.  Climate change and its impacts will be with us for the 
foreseeable future.  There will be plenty of time to consider the possi-
bility of expanding the system.  The priority for now is simply to put 
the outline of a workable alternative on the table. 
 
